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question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many 
different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be 
master—that’s all.”1  
INTRODUCTION 
African Americans in contemporary U.S. society continue to 
experience economic inequality.2 Regardless of the indicators one 
reviews—property ownership,3 employment,4 or income5—the data 
confirms the entrenchment of African Americans’ disadvantaged status. It 
is the thesis of this article that the economically subordinated status of 
African Americans cannot be divorced from the historical processes that 
have created or contributed to the divide between African Americans and 
other social groups. Until emancipation, the overwhelming majority of 
African Americans were enslaved and treated, not as persons, but as 
property.6 They had no legal right to own property and, accordingly, could 
seek no legal redress for the taking or confiscation of property in their 
possession.7 The experience of the African American after slavery was 
similar to the experience of Alice and the “looking glass.”8 The 
disconnection from reality9 and expectations based upon that experience 
are similar to what many ex-slaves experienced once freed and trying to 
move toward citizenship and independence.10 
After the slaves were freed, many thought that autonomy and full 
citizenship could only be secured with the acquisition of property.11 Many 
 
 
 1. LEWIS CARROLL, T HROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS & WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 238 (1946). 
Sometimes the law works very much like Alice’s “looking glass”—making things which are real 
appear fiction and things that are fiction appear real. 
 2. See generally MELVIN L. OLIVER & T HOMAS M. SHAPIRO , BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH 
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY  (1995) (analyzing currently existing economic 
disparities between black Americans and white Americans). 
 3. See id. at 109, tbl. 5.4. 
 4. See id. at 119, tbl. 5.7; see also  JOE R. FEAGIN, LIVING WITH RACISM, THE BLACK MIDDLE-
CLASS EXPERIENCE  136-37 (1994) (noting that blacks commonly experience discrimination in getting 
jobs and receiving equal wages). 
 5. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO , supra  note 2, at 102, fig. 5.2. 
 6. See DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP 24 (1991). 
 7. See id. 
 8. See CARROLL, supra  note 1, at 149. 
 9. See id. at 155. Sitting in a very real room, Alice looked in the mirror and thought that the 
reflection was actually another room. The “looking glass room” in many ways resembled her sitting 
room, but when she entered the “looking glass room,” the experience was completely different from 
her real life experience. Her experiences had not prepared her for the rules that applied in her new 
space. See id. 
 10. See id. at 155-56. 
 11. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 104 (1988); HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLES HISTORY OF 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/2
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ex-slaves believed that the government would ensure some minimal access 
to property.12 Although there was some support for the distribution of land 
to ex-slaves, ultimately the government’s policy and intent failed to 
provide the needed support for the ex-slaves.13 The reality fell far short of 
the ex-slaves’ expectations.14 Opportunities and protection that appeared to 
apply to all citizens, and that for the white majority were real, proved 
illusory for the ex-slave.15 
During Reconstruction and the years that followed, opportunities for 
property acquisition were severely limited, but a small number of 
freedmen were successful.16 Despite incredible odds, freedmen continued 
their efforts to obtain property.17 By the end of the Nineteenth Century, 
legislation and war enactment orders that initially provided former slaves 
limited access to property were either overturned, repealed, or allowed to 
lapse out of existence.18 New restrictions arose that were reinforced by a 
complex web of racist doctrine, local legislation, and property covenants.19 
 
 
THE UNITED STATES 192-93 (1995). Once free, ex-slaves adopted a version of the republican vision of 
citizenship—property ownership guaranteed independence in judgment and action. See FONER, supra, 
at 103-04. Property ownership would provide a means for economic independence, the opportunity for 
civic and political involvement, and an elevation in social standing. Especially in the South, a 
primarily agricultural-based economy, land was an essential asset for the ex-slave. Id. 
 12. See FONER, supra  note 11, at 104-05. Special Field Order No. 15, tax foreclosure sales, and 
the 1866 Southern Homestead Act all demonstrated the brief promise of property distribution open to 
African Americans during Reconstruction. See Phyliss Craig-Taylor, To Be Free: Liberty, Property 
and Race, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 55-64 (1998). Echoing the Lockean theme of rewarding labor 
with ownership, immediately after the Civil War, an African American wrote: 
[I]f strict law of right and justice is to be observed, the country around me is the entailed 
inheritance of the Americans of African descent, purchased by the invaluable labor of our 
ancestors, through a life of tears and groans, under the lash and yoke of tyranny . . . . The way 
we can best take care of ourselves is to have land . . . . 
See ZINN, supra note 11, at 192. 
 13. See LOREN SCHWENINGER, BLACK PROPERTY OWNERS IN THE SOUTH 1790-1915, at 144 
(1990). 
 14. See WILLIE LEE ROSE , REHEARSAL FOR RECONSTRUCTION 408 (1964). As one African 
American remarked of the Reconstruction period: “There is no redress for us from a government 
which promised to respect all under its flag. It is a mystery to me.” Id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See SCHWENINGER, supra note 13, at 68-69. 
 17. There is extensive history on African American attempts to obtain and retain property and 
wealth. See CHARLES ABRAMS,  FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 23-28 (1955); ROBERT C. KENZER, 
ENTERPRISING SOUTHERNERS 9-18 (1997); SCHWENINGER, supra  note 13, at 68-69; WALTER B. 
WEARE , BLACK BUSINESS IN THE NEW SOUTH  3-8, 13-14 (1993). 
 18. See ZINN, supra  note 11, at 199-203; see also  FONER, supra note 11, at 70-71, 153-64 (noting 
the broken promises of Reconstruction plans to provide slaves with land and education, such as 
Sherman’s retraction of Special Field Order No. 15, which provided for the now-famous allotment of 
40 acres and a mule to emancipated slaves); ROSE , supra  note 14, 378-408 (noting that legislative 
schemes to compensate slaves were abandoned once hostilities cooled between northern and southern 
whites). 
 19. See A.  LEON HIGGENBOTHAM,  JR. ,  SHADES OF FREEDOM:  RACIAL POLITICS AND 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Such restrictions limited opportunities for African American land 
ownership and undermined the confidence of African Americans that the 
legal system would protect or buttress an attempt at property ownership.20 
One generation out of slavery, African Americans had few opportunities to 
obtain property and use it as a basis for wealth accumulation.21 This 
established a wealth of disparity that would continue into the next century, 
which when combined with distrust of the legal system, laid the ground 
work for the “looking glass” experience to continue.22  
In this Article, I explore the struggle of ex-slaves and their Twenty-
First century descendants to achieve the promise of property in a 
democratic society and the role of law as a reflection of and tool of racial 
hierarchy. I focus on the role played by the judicial partition process in 
creating a system that inextricably led to stripping African Americans of 
their property. In recent years, courts and legislatures have scrutinized and 
expressed increasing hostility toward exercises of regulatory power that 
effect takings. This Article gives a similar scrutiny to the partition process 
and argues that it should be modified to alleviate the unfair burden it 
places on poor property owners and to assure that property owners are 
afforded just compensation when their property is involuntarily taken to 
achieve a public purpose.23 
In the majority of states, property that passes from generation to 
generation through intestate succession24 results in a tenancy in common if 
there is more than one qualifying heir.25 The cotenants share an interest in 
the property as qualifying heirs under the relevant state intestacy statute.26 
Much of the real property held by African Americans passes to future 
generations through intestate succession. If there is more than one heir, the 
 
 
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 108-26 (1996). 
 20. See Craig-Taylor, supra  note 12, at 55-64 (providing an in-depth discussion of the 
developing structure of discrimination which impeded African Americans’ land ownership). 
 21. See ABRAMS, supra  note 17, at 23-28; KENZER, supra note 17, at 9-18; WEARE, supra note 
17, at 3-8. See generally SCHWENINGER, supra  note 13 (discussing the struggle for property ownership 
among blacks before, during, and after the Reconstruction period) . 
 22. See generally OLIVER & SHAPIRO , supra  note 2. 
 23. This Article analogizes the combined effect of developing judicial and legislative rules for 
partition of co-owned property to the effects of judicially ordered condemnation. 
 24. Intestate succession may be seen as desirable because it keeps property in the family and 
provides a connection to home, where the family began its journey toward citizenship and freedom. 
This represents a legacy of hard work and a symbol of an equalizing force for a politically impotent 
and economically dependent people. It is a type of social leverage. See, e.g., Evelyn Alicia Lewis, 
Struggling with Quicksand: The Ins and Outs of Co-tenant Possession Value Liability and a Call for 
Default Rule Reform , 1994 WIS. L. REV. 331, 335. 
 25. For a complete discussion of the mechanics of intestacy, see infra  Part I.B.  
 26. See Regis W. Campfield, Estate Planning for Joint Tenancies, 4 DUKE L.J. 669, 672-73 
(1974). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/2
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property is held jointly by the heirs as tenants in common. With the death 
of each cotenant, increasing numbers of descendants may step in to take 
that interest by representation.27 The owners become more and more 
numerous as this process continues through each generation. Problems 
develop when the co-owners fail to reach a consensus for use of the 
property. Any interest holder may then force a sale.28 The heart of the 
problem is the inadequate protection given to property owners in the 
context of partition proceedings. Land held by families for generations 
may be ordered against the wishes of the majority of the cotenants to the 
highest bidder in a judicial partition sale.29 Accepting the highest bid as 
determinative of value also creates a bias in favor of the wealthier party. 
The wealth bias and failure to recognize the equal value of other 
noneconomic valuation frameworks thwart attempts by African Americans 
to retain property. Further, the price paid in these proceedings could 
arguably fail to satisfy the just compensation standard, if employed in an 
inverse condemnation conext. 
This Article analyzes the role played by the law of partition and its 
diminished substantive and procedural protection for landowners as 
applied to tenancies in common in the typical story of land loss. Part I 
traces the development of the tenancy in common and explores the nature 
of the partition action, in light of property theory, highlighting the tension 
between protection of one cotenant’s desire to alienate and another 
cotenant’s desire not to alienate, both property rights of great importance. I 
then examine the implementation of partition through state statutes and 
question the manner in which courts applying these statutes resolve this 
tension. Part II explores the courts’ near-universal application of an 
economic valuation formula to resolve partition cases which, in effect, 
delegitimizes any other criteria or value framework for deciding these 
cases.30 Even if one accepts the exclusive focus on economic value as 
adequate, deficiencies in the procedure employed in partition proceedings 
artificially depress the economic value assigned to the subject property, 
 
 
 27. See U.P.C. § 2-106(b) (1990). Under the Uniform Proba te Code, if a decedent’s estate passes 
intestate “by representation,” the estate is divided into as many equal shares as there are (1) surviving 
descendants in the generation nearest to the decedent and (2) deceased descendants in the same 
generation who left surviving descendants, if any. Id. Consequently, it is possible to imagine a large 
number of shares passing to descendants of both the decedent and pre-deceased heirs; this possibility 
vastly complicates the ownership of property passed through intestacy. 
 28. See 4 T HOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY  § 32.08(b), at 88-89 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994). 
 29. See id. 
 30. By refusing to recognize as viable or quantifiable such noneconomic values as the “home 
place” or an ownership of property as essential to full citizenship and independence, the courts choose 
seemingly “objective” methods of resolving disputes regarding the use of the property. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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thus depriving landowners of the fair market value of their land.  
The involuntary nature of partition proceedings, while developed to 
address sometimes intransigent problems created by cotenancies, arguably 
is an excessive intrusion into the rights of lower income landowners. 
Relatively recent legislative acts operate in a manner similar to 
governmental takings by inverse condemnation but without providing as 
assurance that just compensation will be paid. The courts have 
misinterpreted the intent of the judicial partition statutes, which was to 
protect property rights unless extraordinary injury would occur. This goal 
is sacrificed in order to facilitate convenience and efficiency.31 Thus, the 
outcome is to deny the property owner the degree of protection typically 
associated with ownership of property in fee. This creates the experience 
of the “looking glass” for those who lose their property. 
This Article concludes by suggesting several ways courts and 
legislators can respond to ensure that both noneconomic interests are 
afforded an equal footing in judicial partition cases and that the procedures 
employed serve the purpose intended and achieve a full and fair result in 
the judicial partition sale. I recommend that courts and legislators establish 
a legal doctrine with different exit rules for property held in common.32 
I. THE TENANCY IN COMMON AS A FORM OF REAL PROPERTY OWNERSHIP 
“Property is the right of each and every citizen to enjoy and dispose of 
the portion of property guaranteed to him by law . . . . The right of 
property is limited, as are all others, by the obligation to respect the 
property of others.”33 
A. History and Development of Tenancy in Common 
No history of individual rights in the United States would be complete 
without a thorough analysis of the means by which property is acquired, 
 
 
 31. See supra note 30; see also infra  note 96 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to 
the right to partition). 
 32. Although this Article focuses on the African American family, the new exit rules I propose 
would apply to all property owners, not just African Americans. Therefore, my proposal hopes to help 
afford all families greater protection in this setting. This Article focuses on African American families 
to demonstrate how devastating this situation can become for one group of people. Certainly, other 
groups suffer as a result of this regime. For a comprehensive discussion of the importance of racially 
and culturally inclusive perspectives, see Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: 
the “Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 5 (1997). 
 33. Robespierre, Proposed Declaration of Rights, 24 April 1793, in A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY 
OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 431 (John Stewart Hall ed., 1951). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/2
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divided, and transferred. The founders, in their efforts to create a more 
perfect union than their British predecessors, recognized the importance of 
and need for a more equitable distribution of property.34 Thomas Jefferson 
recognized universal distribution of lands as the cornerstone of a 
democratic citizenry.35 To encourage land distribution, new laws were 
adopted to facilitate distribution and alienation of property.36 However, the 
founders’ adherence to the ideal of universal ownership, while facilitating 
alienation, created unforeseen dilemmas.37  
One dilemma was the transition in concurrent interests from a 
presumption of joint tenancies to one of tenancies in common.38 This shift 
 
 
 34. See 1 T HE PAPERS OF T HOMAS JEFFERSON 362 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950); 2 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 201-08 (Max Farrard rev. ed., 1937). 
 35. For a more thorough examination of Jefferson’s notions of property and republicanism, see 
Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & 
ECONOMICS 467 (1976). 
 36. See PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK , T HE LEGACY OF CONQUEST 60-61 (1987); see generally 
PAUL W. GATES, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968) (discussing the way 
American public land law developed to allow private use and ownership of unsettled lands); EVERETT 
DICK , T HE LURE OF LAND (1970) (discussing how immigrants’ desire to become land owners shaped 
public land law) . 
 37. The desire for ease of alienation should not be confused with a desire for equality in property 
ownership rights. For further discussion of the tensions and contradictions in the concept of property in 
the republican vision, see Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal 
Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273 (1991). John Locke hinted at a theory of universal ownership of 
property flowing from one’s labor. See JOHN LOCKE, T WO T REATISES OF GOVERNMENT 134 (1698). 
Locke envisioned that “[t]hough the Earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every 
man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself.” Id. But what then of 
real property? While all property started in the common ownership of humanity, its distribution into 
estates facilitated people’s growth from the natural state. The Lockeian theory of property, adopted by 
Jefferson, focused on humanity’s integration of labor into the land. See Katz, supra note 35, at 474. 
But this system, without limits, allowed the wasteful stockpiling of land that both Locke and Jefferson 
disfavored. See id. at 475. To counterbalance this threat, Locke urged that land not used effectively or 
productively could be repossessed by a more industrious replacement, thereby ensuring that the utility 
of the land would be maximized. See id. While Locke effectively conditioned land ownership on the 
continual input of labor, he failed to address the problem of joint ownership—where both parties have 
added labor and are vying for ownership. See LOCKE, supra , at 134. 
 38. Tenancy in common is a form of concurrent ownership of property in which two or more 
persons own and possess an undivided interest in the whole property. See REEVES ON REAL PROPERTY 
§ 702, at 993-95 (1909); T HOMPSON, supra  note 28, § 32.08, at 88-89. See also WILLIAM CRUISE, THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY  498 (1808); A. C. FREEMAN, COTENANCY AND 
PARTITION 150-56 (1886) (discussing the development of tenancies). Different tenancies are best 
distinguished from each other by which unities they require. The unities required to effectively create a 
joint tenancy interest are: title, time, and possession. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (A. 
James Casner ed., 1952); John W. Fisher, II, Creditors of a Joint Tenant: Is There a Lien After Death, 
99 W. VA. L. REV. 637, 640 (1997). The defining characteristic of the joint tenancy is the theory of 
survivorship. See 7 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ¶ 618 
(1968). Survivorship prevents interests in a joint tenancy from being diluted through division to heirs 
in inheritance. See id. If the joint tenancy is not destroyed before the death of an interest holder, then 
the deceased holder’s interest is absorbed by the surviving joint tenants.  See id. The last surviving 
owner gains title to the entire property in fee simple. See id. Land held in a tenancy in common differs 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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effected a major change in the transmission of property interests. The joint 
tenancy tends to consolidate the number of ownership interests by vesting 
title in the surviving joint tenant(s) at the death of a joint interest holder.39 
By contrast, at the death of a tenant of an estate in common, the interest 
passes by will to a devisee or through intestate succession to the interest 
holder’s heirs.40 In addition, in its earliest conception, the tenancy in 
common could only be terminated by agreement between the parties.41 
Partition between tenants in common could only be voluntary.42 But later, 
individual co-owners were granted the right to demand partition.43 This 
facilitated alienation but also ultimately stripped some co-owners of their 
property.44 A brief history of the transition in concurrent ownership of 
property best demonstrates this effect.45 However, regardless of the time 
framework, the shift effected a major change in the transmission of 
property interests. 
It is uncertain when the courts began to move away from joint 
tenancies toward tenancies in common. As recently as the early Nineteenth 
Century, joint tenancies were still the standard.46 By the end of the 
Nineteenth Century, however, courts had adopted the presumption that 
transfers of property to multiple owners created tenancies in common.47 
Courts utilized the tenancy in common to alleviate the harsh and 
inconvenient effects of survivorship.48 Shifting the presumption to favor 
 
 
from a joint tenancy in that a tenancy in common requires only the unity of possession and lacks the 
principle of survivorship. See id. The tenancy in common is a flexible doctrine that can be applied to 
real, personal, mixed, corporeal, and incorporeal property. See id . It can be created by grant, gift, 
devise, bequeath, or operation of law. See id. An inadequate attempt to form a joint tenancy or tenancy 
in the entirety may also create tenancies in common. See id. The law presumes that owners of real 
property who die intestate with more than one heir create a tenancy in common between the heirs. See 
id. 
 39. Of course even a joint tenancy can be partially or in some cases, completely severed without 
the approval of all owners, by the act of a single joint tenant alienating his or her interest. See Fisher, 
supra note 38, at 641; AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY , supra  note 38, § 6.2. 
 40. See RALPH BOYER, HERBERT HOVENKAMP , & SHELDON F. KURTZ, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 
122 (4th ed. 1991). 
 41. See 4 T HOMPSON, supra  note 28, § 32.08(a)-(b), at 88-89. 
 42. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra  note 38, § 609. 
 43. See id. 
 44. At early common law, property given to two or more people without any restrictive, 
exclusive, or limiting language was presumed to create a joint tenancy. See id. § 602; see also CRUISE, 
supra note 38, at 498. 
 45. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra  note 38, § 609. 
 46. See CRUISE , supra  note 38, at 550. 
 47. See generally, FREEMAN, supra  note 38, at 150-156 (discussing the historical origins of 
tenancy in common). 
 48. See generally RALEIGH COLSTON MINOR & JOHN WURTS, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 589 
(1910). Joint tenants lack the ability to pass inherited property to surviving heirs. See id. Consequently, 
where inherited property presumably devolves in the form of a joint tenancy, title to the property 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/2
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the creation of a tenancy in common encouraged the alienation of 
property, thereby facilitating the offering of more property in the 
marketplace for exchange, which, in turn, increased the opportunity for 
more buyers to obtain property. 
The notion that freedom of disposition is inextricable from rights of 
possession is well supported.49 This supports the argument that a tenant in 
common’s rights of transfer should not be impeded.50 The law disfavors 
any condition that is deemed to render property inalienable—a concept 
that includes any restrictions on the right to transfer property, even in the 
context of a partition action.51 Scholars have criticized restraints on 
alienation52 because they diminish efficiency and free choice. Examples of 
common restraints on alienation are environmental use restrictions and 
zoning restrictions for historical preservation.53 Notwithstanding the 
inalienability rhetoric, however, restraints on alienation are fairly common 
place.54 Locke asserted that one ought “as much as he can, to preserve the 
rest of mankind, and may not, unless it is to do justice to an offender, take 
away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of life: the 
liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.”55 Balancing the notion of free 
alienation against Locke’s belief that property rights are absolute for 
owners who invest in the land, thus, may create a tension. Both the rights 
of possession and alienability are viewed as incidents of ownership. In the 
context of a tenancy in common, in some situations, multiple owners 
cannot maximize their individual property rights without infringing on the 
rights of their cotenants. Each tenant in common has the right to full 
possession of the property.56 Consistent with that right, each possesses the 
right to choose the highest and best use of the property. This is necessarily 
 
 
eventually vests with the last surviving heir, effectively excluding second generation descendants of 
the predeceased heirs. This dynamic works an injustice where testators devise property to multiple 
heirs in an effort to equally distribute the property among surviving descendants.  
 49. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, T AKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
74 (1985) (stating that any restraint upon the power of an owner to alienate his own property should be 
regarded as impermissible). 
 50. Tenants in common face few restrictions on the transfer of their interest. See POWELL & 
ROHAN, supra  note 38, § 608. After the sale of a share of an estate in common is concluded, the new 
interest holder obtains an undivided interest in the property with legal rights equal to the other owners, 
which includes the right of partition. See id. § 607(3). The new cotenant can petition to have the 
property partitioned either in kind or by sale. See id. 
 51. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and The Theory of Property Rights,  85 
COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985) (discussing the concept of inalienability). 
 52. See id. at 931. 
 53. See id. at 937. 
 54. See id . 
 55. LOCKE, supra  note 37, at 124. 
 56. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra  note 38, § 603. 
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qualified by the same right in the other cotenant. Thus, inevitably, a 
conflict arises if one cotenant believes disposal of the property is best, and 
the other cotenant believes maintaining possession of the property in its 
present state is best.57  
Historically, property scholars have debated the definition and relation 
of property and possession.58 Hume defined possession as “not only when 
we immediately touch . . . [anything] but also when we are so situated with 
respect to it, as to have in our power to use it; and may move, alter or 
destroy it, according to our present pleasure or advantage.”59 Hume also 
links mankind to property not through nature, but through the law of 
justice.60 However, the laws of justice and unlimited possession clash 
when applied to the concept of tenancy in common. Can justice be served 
when the rights of one owner can be trampled by the rights of a second 
owner? Blackstone opens his second commentary with this following 
statement on the nature of property: 
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination and 
enrages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that 
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises 
over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right 
of any other individual in the universe.61 
He repeats this theme of near-limitless property rights throughout his 
work, yet subjects it to the restraint “save only the laws of the land.”62 
These two ideals are incompatible when applied to the ownership of 
property in a tenancy in common. This incompatibility seems to repeat 
itself throughout the historical treatment of property: property rights are 
natural and absolute, yet subject to the prevailing laws of man.63 Under the 
 
 
 57. If the dispute is not resolved, a partition action may ensue. See 4 THOMPSON, supra note 28, 
§ 38.03, at 450. If the remedy granted is a judicial sale, the exercise of the right to seek partition by the 
one cotenant effectively cuts off the other tenant’s right of continued possession unless the tenant 
seeking to maintain possession of the property has access to sufficient resources to buy the entire 
estate. Proceeds from the sale are distributed and are expected to replace the lost property. See id. at 
450-54. 
 58. See EPSTEIN, supra  note 49, at 58-59 (discussing this liberal classical conception of property 
as the exclusive right of possession, use, and disposition). 
 59. DAVID HUME , A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE  506 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1946). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND BOOK II, chpt. 
1, at 207 (Sharswood ed., 1889). 
 62. Id.; see also  Robert P. Burns, Blackstone’s Theory of the Absolute Rights of Property, 54 U. 
CIN L. REV. 67 (1985) (noting the extravagance in Blackstone’s famous absolutist assertion). 
 63. For a discussion of the modern conception of property as an aggregate of rights, see BRUCE 
A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 29-31 (1977). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/2
p737 Taylor.doc  4/26/01  4:44 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2000] THROUGH A COLORED LOOKING GLASS 747 
 
 
 
 
prevailing laws of man, property is highly regulated.64  
The legal system faces a dilemma when the rights of one tenant in 
common to maintain possession of property must be reconciled with the 
unlimited rights of a co-owner to force sale of the same property. In 
practice, where one co-owner has limited resources or otherwise lacks the 
interest to acquire the other co-owner’s share, the rights of continued 
possession are forfeited.65 The legal system, by its choice of rules, 
determines which co-owner will be favored and ultimately prevail. In the 
terminology popularized by Calebresi and Melamed, the legal system, by 
the rules adopted, will elect either a property rule or a liability rule to 
protect the rights of the owners not wishing to sell.66 Although Calebresi 
 
 
 64. See, e.g., Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., Common Law Rules and Land-Use Regulations: 
Lucas and Future Takings Jurisprudence, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 3 (1993) (discussing the States’ 
right to use the police power to regulate land considered a nuisance). Property regulation is prevalent 
in many areas. The nuisance area best highlights how land may be regulated and at the same time 
create conflicting land use issues between land owners. Thus, the goal of the legislation regulating 
property is to prevent private use which would be injurious to citizens generally. See Pa. Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See also R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. 1 (1960). 
In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase discussed the reciprocal nature of conflicting land use. If A’s 
land use interferes with B’s land use, then A is harming B. See id . at 2. But if B then has the right to 
stop A, B is harming A. See id. Should A or B have the right to harm the other’s property right? See id. 
Applying an efficiency test seems to be the most logical approach. Under this approach, the legal 
regime can act to avoid the greater harm. But, how does one determine the greater or lesser harm 
between private individuals? Both the land use and nuisance areas are good examples. Under takings 
law, the regulation may be applied without any provision for compensation if the “state does not 
appropriate [the land] or make any use of it.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 
(1922). See also Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding the general 
constitutionality of local zoning regulations that resulted in a 75% diminution in the market value of 
Amber Realty’s sixty-eight acres of vacant land). Euclid established the principle that zoning 
regulation does not deny due process per se or result in a taking; the court will allow regulation in 
cases of public need or compelling state interest. See id. 
 65. The analogy of eminent domain and inverse condemnation would dictate that forfeiture be 
permitted only upon the payment of just compensation. See Walker, supra note 64. As Part II argues, 
the value paid for the forfeited right is inadequate. 
 66. In Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, Calebresi 
and Melamed set out at length the useful distinctions between property and liability rules’ roles in a 
legal system. 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1091, 1105-27 (1972). Calebresi and Melamed start from the 
premise that the first issue all legal systems must confront is determining the cognizable entitlements 
of its citizens. See id. at 1091. In confronting the problem of “entitlement,” the legal system decides 
which of the conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail in a dispute, generally by establishing two 
types of rules: property rules and liability rules. See id. at 1091. In defining the two categories of rules, 
they posit a scenario in which interference with a property owner’s use of land is threatened by a 
second party’s activity. See id. at 1115-19. Either a property rule or a liability rule can be imposed to 
protect the property owners’ initial entitlement to use his property without interference. See id. 
Property rules bestow on property owners powerful protection of their rights. See id. at 1092-93 & n.7. 
Under property rules, property owners possess complete discretion to determine whether to sell their 
property. See id. In other words, an owner determines the selling price of his property rights and can 
not be forced to sell at any price. On the other hand, under the application of liability rules, although 
an owner also enjoys an initial entitlement to property, potential buyers are allowed to destroy his 
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and Melamed developed their analysis in the context of tort and criminal 
law,67 I believe the property rule and liability rule framework is instructive 
when applied to the facts in a partition case. As I will argue in Part II.C 
below, applying a property rule would allow the property owner to 
determine the price, if any, at which he would agree to a sale, and under a 
liability rule, the sale could be forced on the unwilling co-owner and the 
value would be objectively determined. 
B. Creation of Tenancy in Common Through Intestate Succession  
Under intestate succession, when an individual dies without drafting a 
will, his property is distributed to his family as a matter of law.68 Thus, the 
purpose of intestate succession laws is to provide a distribution scheme—a 
will substitute—for those decedents who die without drafting a will.69 The 
lack of estate planning, combined with a fear of the legal system, causes 
the majority of real property owned by African Americans to pass through 
intestate succession.70 Thus, ownership as what I will term “heir property,” 
where land is held by numerous family members as tenants in common, is 
the most wide-spread form of property ownership in the African American 
community.71  
As a result of intestate succession, if there is more than one qualifying 
taker under the intestate statute, then more than one family member will 
own an interest in a single piece of property. By statute, the family 
members are tenants in common.72 Although the cotenants own an 
 
 
entitlement to undisturbed enjoyment by paying an objectively determined price to compensate for 
harm that interferes with his rights. See id. (emphasis added). In other words, liability rules permit 
interference with property rights in return for the payment of damages. Thus, liability rules allow 
potential buyers to forgo the hassle of negotiating to acquire property rights at a price below that which 
the property owner would demand.  
 67. See Calebresi & Melamed, supra  note 66, at 1090-127 (discussing that property and liability 
rules are relevant to every legal area but focused on torts and criminal sanctions involving theft and 
violations of bodily integrity as examples). 
 68. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planning for Unmarried 
Committed Partners: Empirical Lessons for a Preventive and Therapeutic Approach, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 
417, 420 (1999). 
 69. See Sorrels v. McNally , 105 So. 106, 112 (Fla. 1925). 
 70. See CAROL STACK , CALL TO HOME  43-44 (1996). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See REEVES, supra note 38, § 671, at 953-55; 4 T HOMPSON, supra note 28, § 32.06(b)(2), at 
70-79. Ownership of one piece of property can become complex as a result of intestate succession. A 
fairly typical pattern under state succession laws mandates that a decedent’s property go to the 
decedent’s surviving spouse and children. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.102 (1998). However, if there is 
no surviving spouse or children, then the property devolves to the decedent’s parents. See, e.g., FLA. 
STAT. ch. 732.103 (1998). If there are no surviving parents, then the decedent’s property passes to the 
decedent’s siblings. See id. In the next generation, if the inheritor also dies intestate, the potential for 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/2
p737 Taylor.doc  4/26/01  4:44 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2000] THROUGH A COLORED LOOKING GLASS 749 
 
 
 
 
undivided interest in the property, if they own the interest in fee, each 
cotenant can freely alienate, grant, and devise their interest in the 
commonly owned property.73 However, no cotenant can convey a greater 
interest than he owns.74 Accordingly, although a family member may sell 
her interest in the property, that family member, acting alone, cannot effect 
a transfer of the entire property.75  
C. Homogenous and Heterogenous Tenancy in Common Interests 
The underlying scenarios that trigger partition actions reflect a range of 
possible owner interests. Ownership of property in a tenancy in common 
involving individuals with kinship relations to each other may take on 
many configurations.76 Three possible configurations demonstrate the 
range of possibilities.77 First, a homogeneous tenancy in common, is one 
where all co-owners unanimously agree on the same use or disposition of 
the property. They, in effect, act as a single -homogenous owner. Family 
members holding an interest as tenants in common or any set of 
individuals with common interests may constitute a homogeneous unit. 
The owners may be absentee and/or owner/occupiers of the property. The 
property ownership is stable.  
The second, a reconcilable heterogeneous interest includes a co-owner 
or several subsets of co-owners who have different interests and valuation 
contexts for evaluating the use and/or disposition of the property, but they 
have reached a series of negotiated agreements that are completely 
satisfactory to all co-owners as to use and disposition of the property. 
Again, the owners may be absentee and/or owner/occupiers. The 
ownership status is stable, as with a homogeneous interest.  
 
 
fragmentation is repeated. The owner’s or co-owners’ interests in the property are similarly divided 
into even smaller interests in accordance with the statutory distribution scheme. 
 73. See In re Estate of Cleaves, 509 So. 2d 1256, 1258-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). It is 
important to note, however, that not all estates may pass by devise or intestacy; a term of years, a life 
estate, tenancies in the entirety, and joint tenancies may not pass on by will or through intestacy. See 
Roger A. Cunningham et al., T HE LAW OF PROPERTY 78, 206-07 (2d ed. 1993). 
 74. See Kern v. Weber, 155 So. 2d 619, 620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). 
 75. See generally id. (refusing to quiet title to entire parcel for a third party who purchased the 
interest of a family member who held the property as tenant in common with other family members). 
Of course, the judicial partition process effectively grants each tenant the opportunity to force all 
cotenants to sell unless they can afford to purchase the entire parcel. See infra Part II.B.  
 76. In this Article, the term “kinship” is limited to those persons who are entitled to distribution 
under an intestate statute or those persons who succeed by descent and right of relationship to an estate 
in land upon the death of an ancestor. 
 77. More numerical distinctions could be drawn to create additional configurations. However, the 
three presented illustrate the distinctions relevant to this discussion. 
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The third interest, an irreconcilable heterogeneous interest, involves at 
least one subset of co-owners who wish to sell their interest in the 
property. Even though they desire a sale of their interest in the property, 
they fail to negotiate and sell to their co-owners. This situation is dynamic 
rather than stable. Due to the right of alienation, an irreconcilable 
heterogeneous interest devolves. Once a sale to a new co-owner occurs, 
the irreconcilable heterogeneous interest may involve an outsider with no 
family ties to the other co-owners. One possible scenario is that the “alien” 
co-owner then demands that the entire property be placed for sale against 
the desires of other co-owners, thereby “rupturing” the ownership of the 
property. The interest is irreconcilable. The irreconcilable interest must be 
resolved by a judicial partition.78 Accordingly, in a case involving a 
number of related co-owners and a heterogeneous “alien” co-owner, which 
party will acquire sole title to the property if a sale is ordered by the 
partitioning court usually is determined by a bidding war among the 
heterogeneous interest holder and the other property owners.79 The 
irreconcilable heterogeneous interest holder may have purchased the 
individual interest of a cotenant with the specific intention of buying the 
entire parcel through partition. Even without the consent of the other 
homogeneous interest holders, the purchase may become inevitable once 
judicial partition is instituted.80 
Theoretically, any of these three different interest formations could 
convert into one of the others. Indeed, given the infinite variability in 
family members’ potential degree of attachment to and/or interest in the 
 
 
 78. It is possible that this same scenario could develop with a familial co-owner. However, 
experts in the area of land loss have indicated that this scenario more frequently involves an outside or 
alien co-owner. Interview with Henry Sanders, Partner, Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettway, in 
Selma, Ala. (June 10, 1999); Interview with Ralph Paige, Director, The Land Loss Institute, in Atlanta, 
Ga. (July 16, 1999). 
 79. Even though every interest holder may attempt to purchase the property, the person with 
more financial resources and access to credit will pay a higher price to purchase the property; thus, 
they can out -bid the other interest holders and acquire the entire parcel. At the very least, the co-owner 
wishing to keep the property must have access to monetary resources equal to the market value of the 
entire parcel in order to compete. Consequently, under this quasi-liability regime, a price which meets 
or exceeds the predetermined current market value may be paid to the land owners if they have 
sufficient resources to bid the price up to this level. If they lack such resources, the likelihood that fair 
market value will be paid diminishes substantially. See Interview with Henry Sanders, supra note 78. 
In either event, the property is lost to the heterogeneous interest holder, without an avenue for 
redemption or retrieval. See Part II.C. for a full discussion and definition of a quasi-liability rule. 
 80. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra  note 38, § 612. Although there is a statutory presumption for 
an in-kind division of the property, in reality, proving injury through impracticability or infeasibility is 
easy to establish, thus enabling sale of the property. See id. Homogeneous interest holders, who have 
limited resources, usually will not be able to produce sufficient cash or access the necessary financial 
resources to competitively participate in the bidding process.  
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property, and the typical multiplication of co-owners as the property is 
passed to the next generation, it is unlikely that a large number of family 
co-ownership situations starting out as a homogeneous interest can sustain 
that status over time. Particularly with the increasing fragmentation that 
may result from intestate succession, it is much more likely that a 
homogeneous interest will disaggregate into a heterogenous interest with 
potential for “rupturing.”81 It is this “rupturing” of family co-ownership of 
property which results in a judicial partition that I wish to explore in more 
detail. 
II. PARTITION 
“Necessity begat property: and in order to insure that property, 
recourse was had to civil society.”82  
A. Common Law Origins of Partition 
While modern law supports the principle that property rights in 
ownership should be protected, this principle is not absolute. Partition law, 
for example, provides a “back door” to outsiders who wish to strip 
disagreeing cotenants of their property.83 Until the middle of this century, 
at common law a tenancy in common was insulated from the threat of 
judicial partition84 because only voluntary agreement among all owners or 
adverse possession could consolidate the property into sole ownership.85 
 
 
 81. Utilizing an alternative dispute resolution process, the tenants in common may reach an 
amicable agreement for use or possession which does not involve physically dividing or selling the 
property. See FREEMAN, supra  note 38, § 395, at 505. However, the possibility for amicable resolution 
of disagreements over the property may be diminished if one tenant has different or heterogenous 
expectations for the property. See id. § 420, at 540. The heterogeneous interest holder has an equal 
right to use and possession of the property or to petition the court for a division of the property. See id. 
§ 422, at 546. 
 82. BLACKSTONE, supra  note 61, at 8. 
 83. A partition action is a means by which cotenants sever their interests in concurrently owned 
property. See Miller v. Griffin, 128 So. 416, 419 (Fla. 1930). The primary objective of partition is to 
physically divide the co-owned property among co-owners in fair and equal shares. See id. One goal is 
to discard the problems arising from the common ownership of the property. See Garcia-Tunon v. 
Garcia-Tunon, 472 So. 2d 1378, 1379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Diedricks v. Reinhardt, 466 So. 2d 
375, 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Thus, when cotenants cannot privately agree to sever their 
cotenancy, a cotenant can file for a partition by way of judicial proceeding.  See THOMPSON, supra note 
28, § 32.08(b), at 88-89. Generally, a cotenant has a right to partition unless this right is lost by waiver, 
contract, or estoppel. See Caruso v. Plank, 574 So. 2d 1230, 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Condrey 
v. Condrey, 92 So. 2d 423, 426 (Fla. 1957). 
 84. See HERBERT T HORN DIKE T IFFANY, T HE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 307, at 315 
(1940). 
 85. See id. § 307, at 315, § 300, at 302. 
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The courts were largely unwilling to sever the estate through partition.86 
In the United States, partition was established by statute in each of the 
individual states.87 Unlike the partition in kind which existed under early 
common law, the forced judicial partition sale was an American 
innovation.88 Under the modern approach, there is also nearly an absolute 
right to judicial partition.89 The right of cotenants to partition does not 
yield to considerations of hardship, inconvenience, or motivation of the 
petitioner.90 Generally, due to the difficulties associated with common 
possession, partition is considered a positive step.91 Dividing the property 
may promote industry and enterprise and prevent the land from sitting 
barren in the hands of unhappy cotenants.92 Fairness is only relevant as the 
equity between tenants, not to the intrinsic fairness of the partition itself.93 
Each cotenant has the right to receive a share of proceeds from the 
partition sale which represents the percentage of his or her ownership 
interest.94 This regime fails to consider potential unfairness or hardship 
 
 
 86. See generally FREEMAN, supra  note 38, § 421, at 542. Because joint tenants and tenants in 
common were created by agreement, their only remedy was to reach an agreement to partition. See id. 
Neither could compel a partition. See id. The one exception was a coparceny. See 2 AMERICAN LAW 
OF PROPERTY § 6.7 (A. James Casner et al. eds., 1952). The courts would adjudicate the partition of a 
coparceny because it was the product of an inheirtance, not a voluntary act. See id. Coparceny existed 
with the systems of primogeniture under which the eldest son was the heir. See id. If a decedant only 
had daughters, the daughters took as coparcenors. See id. This early form of partition, as it existed in 
1271 A.D. (at the end of the reign of Henry III), was accomplished through a writ of partition. It took 
three centuries for this right to be extended to all estates of tenants in common and joint tenancies. 
 The first statutes which extended the right of partition to tenants in common and joint tenants only 
pertained to concurrent estates created through inheritance. See REEVES, supra note 38, § 702. The 
legislature extended this right to voluntary tenants in common and joint tenants. See id. These statutes 
extended the rights of partition, but enforcement was tediuos and largely ineffectual. See id. It took 
Parliament a century and half to remedy this deficiency by statute. See AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 
§ 6.7 (1952). These statutes were later reinforced to transition from the early system of writs or 
partition into the jurisdiction of the chancery courts. See id. This transition was completed through the 
abolition of the writ. See id. 
 87. See AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 428, at 558. 
 88. See id. § 433, at 570, § 537, at 713, 718. The courts of England were unwilling to force sale 
of partitioned property. See id . § 433, at 570. If an inequitable split could not be avoided, the courts 
would order an owelty—a payment of money to make the portion received of equal value. See id. 
§ 507, at 676-77. In America, a judicial sale was initially authorized when division-in-kind would 
seriously prejudice the value or interests of the owners. See id. § 433, at 571. The prejudice necessary 
to force a sale had to affect all of the owners, not just the owner requesting sale. See id. § 537, at 713. 
The onus to prove damage and prejudice was always on the party requesting a partition sale. See id.  
 89. See 4 T HOMPSON, supra  note 28, § 38.03(a), at 450-54. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. at 446. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. § 38.03(a), at 450-54. 
 94. See id. § 38.05(C) , at 472. In certain cases, no equal partition of the common property can be 
made. See, e.g., Hegewald v. Neal, 582 P.2d 529 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (finding in-kind partition 
impracticable because of the unique nature of the land). This impracticability may be caused by the 
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worked by the judicial partition sale—the transformation of a real property 
interest into personal property—the loss of land.95 Intrinsic fairness of the 
partition should also be essential in the resolution of these cases,96 as very 
few exceptions exist to the right to partition.97 
All tenants in common can file an action for compulsory partition.98 At 
early common law and now by statute,99 there is a presumption in favor of 
severance of co-owned property by physical or in-kind division of the 
property.100 The common law traditionally favored partition in-kind of real 
property held by more than one owner in a tenancy in common or joint 
tenancy when one or more of the owners seeks to sever the common 
ownership.101 Partition in-kind is favored because an actual division 
preserves the succession of real property through familial lines and bars 
compulsion to sell real property against the will of the owners.102  
B. Statutory Partition and Its Judicial Implementation 
Most of the fifty states have enacted statutes which appear to reflect 
this longstanding principle by providing a presumption of severance of 
common ownership in real property by partition in-kind unless the 
proponent of a sale can demonstrate that an actual division would cause 
injury to some or all of the owners.103 However, in practice, as shown 
 
 
irregular shape of the parcel or the large number of co-owners with interest in the property. See id. If 
the partition is voluntary, the court would generally order an owelty to be paid to equalize the division. 
See Reitmeier v. Kalinoski, 631 F. Supp. 565, 576 (S.D.N.J. 1986). However, the court may choose to 
order a sale of the property and then distribute the proceeds to the owners. See, e.g., Hegewald, 582 
P.2d at 529. 
 95. One need not accept the notion that land is unique to recognize that forced sale of real 
property is a significant incursion into individual rights. Although constitutionally permitted to achieve 
a valid public purpose, the taking of property must be accomplished by payment of just compensation 
and satisfy due process requirements. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 96. See, e.g., Brown v. Lutheran Church, 23 Pa. 495, 500 (1854) (noting that land occupied by 
funeral plots can be neither sold nor divided without unfairly affecting the rights of those buried 
therein, and those individual rights may prevent the partition). 
 97. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra  note 38, § 611. 
 98. See id. 
 99. Although partition proceedings are governed by statute, actions in partition are in chancery, 
and thus are actions in equity. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 64.011 (1998) (stating that actions for partition 
are actions in chancery); FLA. STAT. ch. 65.031 (1998) (providing for an action in chancery to quiet 
title of lands). Thus, if a trial court concludes that equity would not result if a partition were ordered, 
the court, in its discretion, may deny the petition. See Condrey v. Condrey, 92 So. 2d 423, 427 (Fla. 
1957). 
 100. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra  note 38, § 612. This Article focuses on how courts routinely 
award partition through forced sale. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. In Florida, for example, compulsory partition is governed by statute. Florida Statute chapter 
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below, this burden has proven so easy to meet that partition sales are the 
rule rather than the exception. Typically, the partition statutes 
ambiguously define the element of injury using rubric such as 
“prejudice,”104 “inconvenience,”105 “practicality,”106 “justice,”107 
“equity,”108 and “interest.”109 Legislatures reason that ambiguous 
 
 
64.051 provides that a court must order in -kind partition if it appears that the cotenants are entitled to 
it. A court will order a partition sale only where it is necessary to protect the rights of interested 
parties. See FLA. STAT. ch. 64.011 (1999) (stating that all actions for partition are actions in chancery). 
 104. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.290 (Michie 1962) (requiring great prejudice to the owners); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-420 (Michie 1987) (requiring great prejudice to the owners); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 38-28-107 (1990) (requiring “manifest prejudice to the rights of the interested parties”); FLA. 
STAT. ch. 64.071 (1997) (requiring prejudice); HAW. REV. STAT. § 668-1 (1988) (requiring great 
prejudice to the owners); IDAHO CODE § 6-512 (Michie 1988) (requiring great prejudice to the 
owners); 735 ILL. COMP . STAT. 5/17-102 (2000) (providing that the court may order a sale if partition 
cannot be made without manifest prejudice to the owners); MICH . COMP . LAWS § 600.3332 (1987) 
(requiring great prejudice to the owners); MINN. STAT. § 558.01 (1988) (requiring great prejudice to 
the owners); MO. REV. STAT. § 528.340 (1953) (requiring great prejudice to the owners); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 70-29-202 (1997) (requiring great prejudice to the owners); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2181 
(1998) )requiring great prejudice to the owners); NEV. REV. STAT. § 39.010 (1985) (requiring great 
prejudice to the owners); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:56-2 (West 1987) (requiring great prejudice to the 
owners); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-7 (Michie 1978) (requiring manifest injury to the parties); N.Y. 
REAL PROP. ACTS LAW § 915 (McKinney 1979) (requiring great prejudice to the owners); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 32-16-12 (1943) (requiring great prejudice to the owners); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.245 (1998) 
(requiring great prejudice to the owners); PA. R. CIV. P. 1563 (1987) (requiring prejudice or spoiling 
to the property); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-45-28 (Michie 1968) (requiring great prejudice to the 
owners); UTAH CODE ANN.  § 78-39-12 (1953) (requiring great prejudice); WASH .  REV.  CODE 
§ 7.52.080 (1992) (requiring great prejudice); WIS. STAT. § 842.11 (1994) (requiring prejudice). 
 105. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4606 (West 1998) (providing that the court may order a 
sale if the property is indivisible by nature or cannot be conveniently divided); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
241, § 31 (1988) (providing that the court may order a sale if the property cannot be divided 
advantageously); N.H. REV.  STAT.  ANN. § 547-C:25 (1998) (requiring great prejudice or 
inconvenience to the owners); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5174 (1997) (requiring great inconvenience to 
the parties); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-83 (Michie 1977) (providing that the court may order a sale if 
partition cannot be conveniently made and the interests of the parties will be promoted); W. VA. CODE 
§ 37-4-3 (1966) (providing that the court  may order a sale if partition cannot be conveniently made and 
if the interests of one or more of the owners will be promoted). 
 106. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1003 (1964) (requiring manifest injury to the owners or that the 
sale is impracticable). 
 107. See ALA. CODE § 35-6-57 (1975) (providing that the court may order a sale if the court finds 
a just and equal division cannot be made or a sale would better promote the interests of the parties). 
 108. See 1980 CAL. STAT. 872.820 (stating a court may order a sale if the court determines a sale 
is more equitable than a division); T EX. R. CIV. P. 770 (1955) (providing that the court may order a 
sale if a fair and equitable division of the property cannot be made). 
 109. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-500 (1991) (providing that the court may order a sale if the court 
finds a sale would better promote the interests of the parties); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 724 (1975) 
(providing that a court may order a sale if the court finds partition would be detrimental to the interests 
of the parties); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-21-11 (1972) (providing that the court may order a sale if the 
court finds a sale will better promote the interests of the parties). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1218 
(1994) (defining injury as a depreciation in the value of the property); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-6-166.1 
(1991) (defining injury as a depreciation in the value of the property); IND. CODE § 32-4-5-4 (1982) 
(requiring damage to the owners); MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROPERTY  § 14-107 (1996) (requiring loss 
or injury to the interested parties); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-22 (1984) (providing that “substantial injury” 
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definitions of injury offer courts much needed flexibility in dealing with 
the complexities of modern property transactions.110  
Because of the substantial similarity of the statutes, one can distill the 
essence of what must be proven by a cotenant seeking compulsory 
partition sale. The interest holder must assert that: (1) he has a right to 
partition as a matter of general right, and (2) a physical partition would be 
infeasible.111 The petitioner may use a number of arguments to establish 
the second prong of infeasibility. One frequent argument is the difficulty 
in dividing the property due to its unique topographical features.112 Courts 
have held that where the topographical features would render the division 
substantially unequal in value a partition sale is appropriate.113 Petitioners 
have also successfully argued that it is infeasible for the court to 
physically partition the land since several of the divided parcels would be 
land-locked and devoid of accessible rights-of-way or not of equal value
 
 
can be shown if the fair market value of each share would be materially less in an in-kind partition 
than the value of each share in a partition by sale); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5307.09 (West 1997) 
(requiring manifest injury to the value of the property); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1509 (1988) (requiring 
manifest injury to the owners); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-15-16 (1956) (permiting the court to order a 
sale); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 15-61-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (providing that the court may order a sale if 
partition cannot be fairly or impartially made without injury to any of the parties); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 29-27-201 (1955) (providing that the court may order a sale if the property is so situated that 
partition cannot be made or if the property is of such description that it would be manifestly 
advantageous for the parties to sell); but see IOWA R. CIV. P. 270 (providing that the proponent of 
partition in -kind carries the burden of showing that partition in -kind is equitable and practicable). 
 110. See, e.g., Reports Recommendations & Studies, 13 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM. 413-14 
(1975-1976) (noting the importance of offering courts flexible remedies to deal with modern property 
transactions). 
 111. As has been noted above, partition is generally available; thus satisfying the first prong 
requires only a showing of valid co-ownership interest and disagreement. 
 112. See Williams v. McIntyre, 632 So. 2d 446, 448-49 (Ala. 1993) (noting that the topography of 
the land to be partitioned varied widely); Black v. Stimpson, 602 So. 2d 368, 369 (Ala. 1992) (citing as 
reason not to partition that portions of the land were susceptible to flooding).  
 113. See, e.g., Hegewald v. Neal, 582 P.2d 529, 532 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that unique 
topography rendered in-kind division impracticable). 
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or desirability.114 Other courts have used a similar rationale in ordering 
sale where land containing unique resources, such as hot springs and other 
water sources, hunting and fishing grounds, or other special attributes, 
would make actual division complex.115 However, the property’s unique 
qualities are often the precise reason why parties are resisting sale.116 One 
of the most commonly cited reasons for ordering a partition by sale is the 
existence of too many interests in the commonly held property.117 Courts 
find partition in-kind impracticable if it requires a division of property into 
so many pieces that the property’s economic value is diminished.118 While 
this rationale seems to preserve the rights of interest holders by protecting 
property values, court policy to order a sale whenever too many interests 
exist places the power to force a sale into the hands of any one 
heterogeneous interest holder.  
Another reason commonly used by the courts to order sale is the 
existence of a dwelling on the subject property.119 At first blush, the 
existence of a dwelling on the property seems to be a compelling reason to 
order sale. In some cases, strict application of the common law right to 
 
 
 114. For illustrative purposes, consider the following diagram of a single parcel of property 
subject to division among twenty-five co-owners: 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 8 9 10 
11 12 13 14 15 
16 17 18 19 20 
21 22 23 24 25 
 
At the very least, parcels 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, and 19 are land locked and probably would not 
have access to their parcels by a right-of-way. Thus, a physical partition among all twenty-five owners 
would probably be infeasible. The land-locked parcels would have right to an easement by necessity 
for ingress and egress; however, the location of some parcels on public right-of-way allows the 
petitioner to assert that the parcels have distinctly different attributes. The differences in attributes then 
makes the in-kind division impracticable. 
 115. See Cunningham v. Frymire, 325 P.2d 555, 558 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Hegewald v. Neal 
582 P.2d 529, 530 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). 
 116. See Brown v. Boger, 139 S.E.2d 577, 580 (N.C. 1965). Defendants stated that they did not 
wish to sell their land as it was “down next to Morrow Mountain and they aren’t making any more 
land down there.” Id. Partrick v. Preiser, 341 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (recognizing 
that, because “all land is unique” and not a “fungible commodity”, partition by sale should be based on 
“some circumstance other than the uniqueness of the land to be divided”). 
 117. See Ragland v. Walker, 411 So. 2d 106, 107 (Ala. 1982); Jefcoat v. Powell, 108 So. 2d 868, 
871 (Miss. 1959); Johnston v. Duncan, 180 S.E.2d 348, 350 (Ga. 1971); Duke v. Hill, 314 S.E.2d 586, 
587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984). 
 118. See Ragland, 411 So. 2d at 107; Johnston, 180 S.E.2d at 350; Jefcoat, 108 So. 2d at 871; 
Duke, 314 S.E.2d at 587. 
 119. See Baker v. Baker, 250 S.E.2d 436, 437 (Ga. 1978); Huston v. Swanstrom, 13 P.2d 17, 18 
(Wash. 1932); Cf. Wilcox v. Willard Shopping Center Associates, 544 A.2d 1207, 1209 (Conn. 1988). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/2
p737 Taylor.doc  4/26/01  4:44 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2000] THROUGH A COLORED LOOKING GLASS 757 
 
 
 
 
partition in-kind would require the court to divide the house into pieces, 
forcing cotenants to jointly retain and use the property permanently. 
Courts typically cite the importance of preserving the alienability of 
property as a principle reason for selling property with a dwelling rather 
than ordering actual division.120 However, the existence of a home or 
dwelling on the subject property often makes a forced sale disastrous for 
the party opposing sale.121 Not only is the opponent of sale effectively 
divested of their ownership interest in their property, but the opponent of 
sale may be rendered homeless by the sale where the opponent cannot 
raise sufficient funds to purchase the property outright at the partition 
sale.122 The compelling arguments against dispossessing cotenants who 
reside in commonly held property have persuaded some courts to find that 
a judicially ordered sale is inequitable. These courts often cite the grave 
injustice caused by forcing the sale of an interest holder’s home as a 
justification for ordering partition in-kind.123  
Courts have not used the general “injury” language of the statutes to 
offer equitable relief to heirs resisting forced sale from outside parties. 
Instead, courts have interpreted the element of injury as allowing sale 
whenever the sale’s proponent can prove that partition in-kind of real 
property would result in pecuniary loss to some or all of the owners.124 
Consequently, although state legislatures ostensibly enacted these statutes 
in order to preserve family inheritance and to bar forced sales of real 
property,125 the pecuniary loss standard adopted by all of the states has 
 
 
 120. See, e.g., Whatley v. Whatley, 484 S.E.2d 420, 421-22 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing the 
strong public policy in North Carolina favoring free alienation and marketability of real property and 
concluding that partition by sale comported with North Carolina policy where actual partition would 
divide title of land and buildings); Ferguson v. McLoughlin, 584 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1992) (holding that partition in -kind would be impossible because it would render the single building 
inalienable and destroy the marketability). 
 121. See Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 29 (Conn. 1988); Overstreet v. Overstreet, 692 So. 2d 
88, 90 (Miss. 1997) (ordering partition in this case would require sale of house that husband built by 
hand during period of marital separation). 
 122. See Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 29 (Conn. 1988); Overstreet v. Overstreet , 692 So. 2d 
88, 91 (Miss 1997); see also Bomer v. Campbell, 318 S.E.2d 841, 842 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) 
(recognizing that it is a “matter of common knowledge that few people in this state are capable of 
depositing” the requisite amount of money required as a cash bond at a partition sale); Duke v. Hill, 
314 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (noting the difficulty parties have in raising sufficient funds 
to bid on property at a partition sale). 
 123. See, e.g., Overstreet, 692 So. 2d at 90. 
 124. See Butte Creek Island Ranch v. Crim, 186 Cal. Rptr. 252, 256 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (stating 
that the test for injury is economic); Partrick, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 808 (stating that the test for determining 
injury is whether the aggregate of the divided parts is substantially less than the whole value of the 
property if owned by one person); Williamson Inv. Co. v. Williamson, 96 Wash. 529, 536 (1917) 
(holding that the “great prejudice” element of injury is satisfied by a showing of pecuniary loss). 
 125. See Butte Creek Island Ranch, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 255. 
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reduced the presumption of partition in-kind to a procedural barrier, easily 
overcome by a mere showing of the loss of any pecuniary value.  
Once a court finds that compulsory partition by way of judicial sale is 
necessary, it orders the entire126 property sold at market price, applying a 
quasi-liability rule.127 Unless the cotenants have access to resources equal 
to the total economic value of the entire co-owned parcel, they may lose 
their interest in a partition sale. The desire of other interest holders in the 
tenancy in common to retain their property is relegated to a secondary 
position. The court’s primary focus is whether there would be injury to a 
cotenant seeking partition, if partition was denied. Injury is, more often 
than not, defined as economic loss.128  
A review of case law illustrates the tendency of courts to consider only 
monetary interests when deciding a petition for sale, even when opponents 
of a sale offer a creative solution that fairly compensates the party seeking 
sale.129 Adherence to the economic loss standard has led courts throughout 
the nation to render seemingly inconsistent and inequitable results in the 
name of preserving the market value of the commonly held property.130 
 
 
 126. Note that if a court only ordered a judicial sale of the petitioning party’s interest in the 
property, the person seeking the partition would not be able to acquire the entire property. However, 
because courts only recognize the economic value in land, courts order a judicial sale of the entire 
property because the physically equal land may be worth more in the aggregate than it is in divided 
shares. See, e.g., Williamson, 96 Wash. at 529 (using an economic standard for determining injury). 
 127. Again, courts only recognize an economic value in land. Thus courts order the land sold at 
market value instead of “heirloom” value because, in essence, heirloom value is priceless. See infra 
Part II.C.3. The failure to allow a veto on the part of the opponents of the sale denies them property 
rule protection. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 128. See Stone v. Benton, 371 S.E.2d 864, 864 (Ga. 1988); Baker v Baker, 250 S.E.2d 436, 437 
(Ga. 1978); Hames v Shaver, 191 S.E.2d 861, 863 (Ga. 1972); Lankford v. Milhollin, 37 S.E.2d 197, 
200 (Ga. 1946); Anderson v. Anderson, 108 S.E. 907, 908 (Ga. Ct. App. 1921); Gordon v. Mcelroy, 42 
S.E. 68, 68 (Ga. 1902); Duke v Hill, 314 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984). 
 129. For example, in Ragland v. Walker, the Alabama Supreme Court refused to reverse a 
decision ordering sale of commonly held land, despite the request of family heirs that the Court set 
aside a portion of the land for those who wanted to continue common ownership. 411 So. 2d 106, 108 
(Ala. 1982). The Court reasoned that a division of the property into smaller tracts prior to sale would 
affect the overall sale value of the individual interests. See id. Thus, rather than attempting to preserve 
ownership while still compensating those interest holders petitioning for sale, the Court employed a 
strictly economic analysis in deciding to affirm the order for sale. See id. Similarly, in Black v. 
Stimpson, the Court refused to partition in -kind rather than order sale, despite the request of several 
common interest owners to set aside a portion of the land for those who wanted to continue common 
ownership. 602 So. 2d 368, 369 (Ala. 1992). The Black decision is particularly startling because two of 
the interest holders actually lived on the subject property, so that sale would effectively render the two 
interest holders homeless. See id. at 370. Furthermore, while the interest holders requesting partition 
in-kind were all heirs of the original land owner, the primary interest holder petitioning for sale was a 
third party who had purchased the interest of one of the heirs. See id. Cf. Cain v. Christie, 937 P.2d 
119, 123-24 (Okl. Ct. App. 1997) (allowing a number of interest holders to retain common ownership 
of one parcel, while selling another parcel of land to compensate interest holders requesting sale). 
 130. Partin v. Dalton Property Associates exemplifies the strict construction courts employ to 
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Despite the inconsistencies and potential unfairness produced by the 
pecuniary loss standard, the standard has become so common that some 
states have expressly incorporated it into the relevant statute.131  While 
most states have retreated from the presumption favoring partition in-kind 
through judicial or statutory application of the pecuniary loss standard, at 
least one state, Iowa, has expressly abandoned the presumption favoring 
partition in-kind altogether.132 Even prior to this change in the statute, 
Iowa seemed to apply a pecuniary loss standard.133 
Real property, the asset Jefferson, Adams, Madison, and other founders 
considered the cornerstone of republicanism, can be stripped from 
productive owners by a cotenant.134 After the court orders a sale, a bias in 
favor of wealthier cotenants is clear if the highest offering price is going to 
 
 
determine whether partition by sale is necessary. 436 S.E.2d 903 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997). The trial court 
determined that the nature of the land and the number of interests in the subject property made 
partition in -kind impractical and necessitated sale. Id. at 904. The appellate court reversed and 
remanded the trial court to monetize the injury if partition resulted in “a cotenant who receives a 
portion of the land, which has a greater value than his proportionate share of the property’s total 
value.” Id. at 906. The Partin  analysis suggests that under the amended North Carolina statute, 
economic factors are dispositive of the propriety of a partition by sale to the exclusion of other 
equitable factors.  
 131. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1218 (1994); 1985 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-6-166.1 (1991); N.C. 
GEN STAT. § 46-22 (1984). The North Carolina statute provides that the court shall order a sale if it 
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a partition in -kind cannot be made without substantial 
injury to one or more of the parties. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 46-22(a) (1984). The statute also provides 
that “substantial injury” can be shown if the fair market value of each share would be materially less in 
an in-kind partition than in partition by sale. Id. § 46-22(b). 
 132. See IOWA R. CIV. P. 270. The Iowa statute states that a proponent of an actual, physical 
division of real property must show that partition in -kind is equitable and practicable to the parties. 
The burden is placed on the proponent of an actual, physical division rather than the party seeking sale 
of the property. In Spies, one co-owner of a 100 acre farm sought partition by sale. See Spies v. Prybil, 
160 N.W.2d 505, 506 (Iowa 1968). The Court held that a second co-owner who sought partition in-
kind did not prove that partition in -kind was equitable or practicable. Id. at 509. The Court noted the 
Iowa legislature’s intentional and unequivocal favoring of partition by sale—the presumption of Rule 
270—although contrary to longstanding common law principles in other states. Id. at 508. Since the 
proponent of partition in -kind did not offer evidence on the financial value of the improvements, 
which included a house, machine shed, and corn crib, and did not propose a method of division that 
would provide pecuniary equality for each of the party’s interests, the statutory burden was not 
satisfied. Id. 
 133. See Murphy v. Bates, 276 N.W. 29, 30 (Iowa 1937) (holding that property should be sold 
when a division would depreciate its aggregate value). See also  Nehls v. Walker, 244 N.W. 850, 851 
(Iowa 1932) (holding partition in -kind is impracticable when a division results in a sacrifice of 
property value); Snyder v. Synder, 233 N.W. 498, 499 (Iowa 1930) (holding partion-in-kind is 
impracticable if a division would cause a considerable depreciation in value of smaller tracts); Porter 
v. Wingert, 190 N.W. 330, 331 (Iowa 1922) (upholding an order for sale where the party resisting sale 
made several offers to divide property on the grounds that the parcel was encumbered with mortgages 
that made in-kind partition difficult); Brown v. Cooper, 67 N.W. 378, 380,81 (Iowa 1896) (setting 
aside an order to partition in-kind on the grounds that partitioning a commonly held water supply 
would require the parties to incur considerable costs). 
 134. See supra  note 35. 
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determine who obtains title to the property. Madison warned of: 
. . . the unreasonable advantage [wealth bias] gives to the sagacious, 
the enterprising, and the moneyed few over the industrious and 
uninformed mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning 
commerce or revenue, or in any matter affecting the value of the 
different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who 
watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared 
not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of 
their fellow citizens.135 
In today’s society, it is the uninformed masses that Madison described 
who suffer from the wealth bias inherent in the partition by sale of tenancy 
in common property. While some take advantage of estate planning, the 
poor and minorities all too frequently leave their property to pass through 
intestate succession because they lack a full understanding of the laws and 
the consequences.136  
C. A Critique of the Case Law 
1. Towards Property Rule Protection for Co-Owners 
By consistently ruling for the compulsory sale of the entire property, 
the courts in effect have created a regime in which a nonconsensual taking 
of property by the highest bidder is permitted. This nonconsensual taking 
of property is accompanied with what, supposedly, represents an 
appropriate payment in fair and objective “damages” to the other “former” 
co-owners. In actuality, the courts have, in the name of efficiency, effected 
a redistribution of property away from co-owners who do not wish to lose 
their property to advance pecuniary interest.137 
In resolving the entitlement issues surrounding cotenancy, the courts 
have tended to apply a strong liability-like or what I will call a “quasi-
liability rule” to resolve conflicting rights.138 The application of a quasi-
 
 
 135. T HE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 472 (James Madison) (1869).  
 136. See CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE 
PRESENT 17 (1987) (noting that wealthy decedents are much more likely to have a will than those 
without wealth). 
 137. This argument does not require that we discount the usefulness of economic valuation, only 
that we recognize its limitations—namely, its exclusion of other socially important values that are not 
reducible to dollars. See infra Part II.C.3; see also infra  note 197. Further, the argument rests on 
evidence that legislatures intended courts to consider a broader definition of injury. 
 138. See Calebresi & Malamed, supra  note 66. Calabresi and Melamed set out in length the useful 
distinctions between property and liability rules’ roles in a legal system. See id. at 1105-27. In defining 
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liability rule appears tied to a desire to achieve economic efficiency and 
consistency. Although both economic efficiency and consistency are 
legitimate goals, other very important implications arise from applying a 
quasi-liability rule over a property-like rule in partition cases.139 
Considering the historical significance and connection of property 
ownership to citizenship in this country, the destruction by court-ordered 
sale of a property owner’s future expectation of ownership based on 
economic efficiency raises many concerns. 
A property rule would protect an owner’s right to possession of 
property,140 discourage nonconsensual takings,141 and encourage 
negotiations in order to effect a transfer of property.142 Legal economists 
argue that application of a property rule is sometimes undesirable because 
the cost of determining the value of the initial entitlement through 
negotiation may be so high that the transaction would probably not 
occur.143 Accordingly, legal economists generally advocate the 
applicability of liability rules.144 Although the use of liability rules may be 
best applied in certain areas of the law (for example, eminent domain and 
torts), the use of liability rules to determine entitlement in the partition sale 
context raises more difficult questions.145  
 
 
the two categories of rules, they posit a scenario in which interferences with a property owner’s use of 
the land is threatened by a second party’s activity. See id. at 1115-19. Either a property rule or a 
liability rule can be imposed to protect the property owner’s entitlement to use of his property without 
interference. Property rules bestow on property owners powerful protection of their rights. Under 
property rules, property owners possess complete discretion to determine whether or not to sell their 
property. In other words an owner determines the selling price of his property rights and will not be 
forced to sell at any price. 
 139. Epstein makes a passing reference to this question, but incorrectly assumes that courts apply 
the property-like rule. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of 
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2107 (1997). 
 140. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic 
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716 (1996). 
 141. See supra  text accompanying note 65. 
 142. While encouraging negotiation, the rule ultimately places the power to “hold out” and reject 
all offers in the property owner’s hands. See, e.g., Marla Jo Fisher, Disney Holdout Farmer Dies, THE 
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Sept. 29, 1998, available at 1998 WL 2651363. This Article 
demonstrates the protection of the property rule in action. Hiroshi Fujishige, a strawberry farmer, will 
forever be famous for rejecting offers from the Walt Disney Company and resort developers that 
would have made him an instant millionaire. Id. The protection of the property rule allowed Fujishige 
to preserve his traditional way of life on his fifty-six acre farm. 
 143. See Calabresi & Melamed,  supra  note 66. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Richard Epstein critiques Calebresi and Melamed’s discussion of the property and liability 
rule application in his path-breaking article, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of 
Property Rules:  
It is one thing to articulate a distinction; it is another to determine how it should be used. 
Although their work was path breaking in many ways, Calebresi and Melamed nonetheless 
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For example, commentators have suggested that liability rules in 
eminent domain actions are necessary for the very existence of 
government.146 The sovereign’s superior right trumps the rights of an 
individual landowner.147 The use of a liability rule to resolve tort claims 
for past harm is arguably also necessary. If the harm to or interference 
with property rights has occurred, there is no window of opportunity for 
negotiation to prevent the conflict and allow the parties to reach an 
amicable resolution. The property right has already been invaded; the only 
question is whether to provide compensation for past harm. The question 
of whether to grant an injunction to prevent future harm is distinct.  
In contrast, the application of a liability rule is not necessary, and is 
indeed, undesirable, as between private parties when a non-owner offers to 
purchase a property interest from an owner in a classic real estate transfer. 
As a general matter, real estate ownership is governed by property rules. In 
part, this reflects the fact that real estate is valued differently from 
individual to individual.148 Moreover, cultural groups value property 
differently.149 Since land is unique and valued differently by individuals, 
as between private parties, the only equitable way to compensate a 
 
 
failed to address systematically the challenge of deciding whether legal protection via a 
property or a liability rule should be conferred to holders of particular sorts of assets, or why. 
Epstein , supra  note 139, at 2092. 
 146. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, T HE T RANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 63-66 (1977); see 
generally James W. Ely, Jr., “That due satisfaction may be made”: The Fifth Amendment and the 
Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1992); 1 PHILLIP NICHOLS, THE 
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.1-1.3 (3d ed. 1992). 
 147. This same consideration does not apply in the partition context, where the rights of two 
individuals or groups of individuals are at odds. The sovereign’s superior status is based on these 
following facts: (1) individual ownership is derived from grants from the state and the state had 
original and absolute ownership; (2) the sovereign is serving a larger public purpose; and (3) forcing 
the government to negotiate with each property owner would be onerous and expensive for taxpayers. 
 148. See Bell v. Alsip, 435 So. 2d 840, 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
 149. See infra  text accompanying notes 221-22. Also note that African Americans are not the only 
cultural groups that hold land sacred. For example, many Native Americans also view land as sacred. 
See D.R. Lewis, Native Americans and the Environment: A Survey of Twentieth-Century Issues, 19 
AM. INDIAN Q. 423 (1995). See also  E. DURKEIM, T HE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 
(1915); STEWART GUTHRIE, FACES IN THE CLOUDS (1993); D.E. Booth, The Economics and Ethics of 
Old-Growth Forests, 14 ENVTL. ETHICS 43, 58-62 (1992); R.L. Hopcroft & J.M. Whitmeyer, 
Community, Capitalism, and Rebellion in Chipas, 39 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 517 (1996); C.C. 
Horton & T.R. Peterson, Rooted in the Soil: How Understanding the Perspective of Landowners Can 
Enhance to Management of Environmental Disputes, 81 Q.J. SPEECH  139 (1995); Jeffrey Kline & 
Martsa J. Mazzotta, Environmental Philosophy and the Concept of Nonuse Value, 71 LAND ECON. 244 
(1995); R. Asedillo, Sense of the Sacred, The Other Side (on file with author); Norman Hadley, Places 
of Power (Spiritual Landscapes of the Inuit), Royal Canadian Geographical Society (on file with 
author); R. Rudner, Sacred Geographies: Indian Country, Time, Land, Tradition, and Law are 
Joined—or Should Be, Wilderness Society (on file with author); Johnson Trebbe, Native Intelligence 
(Team-Up Between Environmentalist and American Indians for Environmental Protection), Natural 
Resources Defense Council (on file with author). 
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property owner is to pay the exact price for which the owner is willing to 
part with his land. The choice of the term “property rule” reflects that an 
estate in property typically cannot be acquired without the seller’s consent. 
While making a clear set of distinctions between property rules and 
liability rules, Calabresi and Melamed argue that ultimately it does not 
matter; the same result will be obtained under either set of rules.150 
Richard Epstein pointed out a significant gap in their analysis.151 Given a 
world with transaction costs and real time, Epstein argues that choosing 
between the two rules will have “major consequences for the overall 
operation of any legal system.”152 While Calabresi and Melamed present a 
variety of factors to consider in determining entitlement, (for example, 
economic efficiency, distributional preferences, and other just 
considerations),153 economic efficiency has become increasingly seen by 
some scholars as a primary justification for supporting the choice between 
property and liability rules.154 This seems to have led to a preoccupation 
with “high theory”— theory producing an often elegant model but one 
which, in many instances, may be devoid of historical, practical, and legal 
context.155  
Property has been regarded as a distinctive right essential to liberty and 
as placing a limit on governmental authority.156 Even designating the 
categories of “property rules” or “liability rules,” hints at the persistence of 
this vision of property and its rhetorical power. The term property  captures 
the core of what ownership means inside this vision—that one will have 
some input in determining the retention or transfer of this interest. In 
compulsory partition actions, the courts are failing to honor this right to 
determine. Instead, the courts apply a quasi-liability rule, allowing this 
core element of property ownership to be entirely removed without 
consent. No higher public interest has been established in these cases as 
 
 
 150. See Calebresi & Melamed, supra  note 66, at 1105-27. 
 151. Epstein criticized Calebresi and Melamed for failing to address systematically when and why 
legal protection should be provided via a property or liability rule. See Epstein, supra  note 139, at 
2092. Although Epstein’s insight on the limitations of Calebresi and Melamed’s analysis is apt, I argue 
that Epstein’s excessive reliance on economic efficiency is unwise and may create a new set of issues. 
See id. 
 152. See id. at 2092. 
 153. See Calebresi & Melamed, supra  note 66, at 1093-105. 
 154. See id. at 1093-98. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 22-23 (2d 
ed. 1977) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]. 
 155. See Epstein, supra  note 139, at 2095 (critiquing the essay of Ian Ayers and J.M. Balkin, 
Legal Entitlement as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 
(1996)). 
 156. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 248 (1990). 
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compared to the takings area. Here, the courts allow a private actor with a 
private interest to enjoy quasi-liability rule status. Even though most state 
statutes still give lip-service to a presumption of division-in-kind, a review 
of the cases reveals that the presumption is rarely honored and the 
application of a quasi-liability rule is the prevailing trend.157 
2. Expanding the Metric: Recognizing Incomemensurability 
Not only in deciding whether to force sale of the property, but also in 
selecting a method of valuation, the courts have focused on economic 
efficiency. In partition cases, courts have adopted this single metric for 
determining value based on what on the surface appears to be a reasonable 
and practical rationale: the valuation process should advance wealth 
creation and maximization.158 The rationale which supports this paridigm 
is that a market/auction process establishes an “objective” determinant of 
value that can be applied universally by the courts to resolve ruptured 
interests in an efficient manner and does not require the courts to apply 
any “subjective” definitions to the process. All interested parties have the 
opportunity to demonstrate the degree to which they value the property by 
offering to pay more for the property than other bidders.159 Under closer 
scrutiny, however, this process does not provide an objective metric of 
value but instead, is riddled with subjective assumptions about the “higher 
order” of economic value—that the highest price offered represents the 
highest intensity of valuing the property.160 In short, it assumes the actors’ 
 
 
 157. See, e.g., Black v. Stimpson, 602 So. 2d 368, 369 (Ala. 1992) (applying an economic test in 
spite of efforts by interest holders to craft equitable alternatives). Allowing a partition sale where one 
individual takes sole title to the property has the potential benefit of minimizing future disputes and 
honoring the myth of property ownership—“sole and despotic dominion.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 
61. For other discussions of the tendency to consolidate authority over property in a single owner, see 
generally  Gregory Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985) (discussing property as a bundle of rights). 
 158. Courts attempt to provide a consistent and efficient method of dealing with partition cases 
involving ruptured interest in cotenancy property by adopting a single metric of valuation. 
 159. See Fine v. Sharer, 571 P.2d 1252 (Or. 1977). This approach was articulated in Fine where 
the court stated that “the financial interest of the owners is the primary factor to be considered” in 
partition cases and other alleged value is “necessarily subordinate to the pecuniary interest of the 
parties.” Id. at 1254. The Fine court’s analysis indicates that a party alleging sentimental or other 
noneconomic value can not expect to have their claim weighed equally with economic claims. Any 
party alleging sentimental or other value would be forced to protect his interest by making the highest 
bid at the public sale. Id. 
 160. The courts choose to subordinate other indices of value in the wealth maximizing formula 
which may only benefit a minority interest holder. See, e.g., Fine, 571 P.2d at 1254-55. By adopting 
this approach, courts are not honoring the original and primary intent of the partition statutes—to 
sustain family interest in property. The wealth maximization approach also ignores the social, cultural, 
and political consequences of ordering a forced redistribution of property away from less wealthy 
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primary motivation is economic advancement.  
But this assumption is flawed when some of the actors have other 
overriding interests which they place ahead of economic advancement. 
The possible willingness to forego increased pecuniary gains in partition 
cases argues for considering alternative modes of valuation. I argue that in 
these cases, valuing property as a mere tool of wealth maximization, is 
artificial and extremely limited.161 To the extent that this approach limits 
our ability to achieve effective and equitable resolutions to resolve 
partition disputes, we need to subject it to closer scrutiny. Courts, in 
employing both a pecuniary loss standard to resolve claims and to auction 
property in a partition by sale, make two significant and I believe, highly 
contestable assumptions to undergird their decisions: (1) that a single 
hierarchy of values exists which can be used to determine the disposition 
of a ruptured heterogeneous interest in real property; and (2) that 
pecuniary interest or wealth maximization is at the top of this hierarchy. 
An examination of the subjective underpinnings of the courts’ hierarchical 
valuation framework is needed. 
The economic efficiency framework is attractive for many reasons. 
Some scholars have argued that economic efficiency (wealth 
maximization) increases the overall wealth of society and therefore, adds 
to the total social good.162 Some have even argued that all human goods 
and relationships can and should be reduced to this single metric of 
valuation163 and that a number of social problems would be more 
“efficiently” resolved by applying maximizing criteria.164 By adopting, 
formally or informally, this valuation viewpoint, the court has “drowned 
out” other, alternative valuation frameworks.165 Other valuation 
frameworks reflect very different views on the desirability of ownership, 
 
 
members of society to accommodate the pecuniary gain of wealthier parties.  
 161. The rationale which supports this paradigm is that a market or auction process creates an 
“objective” valuation of the property which can be applied universally and efficiently by the courts to 
resolve ruptured interests because courts will not have to apply any “subjective” definitions to the 
process. See RICHARD A. POSNER, T HE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE  353-59 (1990) [hereinafter 
POSNER, PROBLEMS]. 
 162. See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra  note 161; POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 154; 
RICHARD POSNER, T HE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE  88-115 (1981) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMICS]. 
Posner suggests that, while not perfect, “wealth maximization provides an ethically adequate guide to 
common law decision making—indeed a superior guide to any other that has been suggested.” 
POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra  note 161, at 390. 
 163. For a leading exponent of this approach, see GARY BECKER, T HE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5-14 (1976). 
 164. For an extraordinary application of this approach see Elizabeth M. Landes & Richard Posner, 
The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978). 
 165. See generally infra  Part II.C.3. 
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maintenance, and alienability of land. Even a cursory examination of some 
of the other frameworks for valuation reveals a very rich and diverse 
approach to defining value in more than economic terms.  
Gregory Alexander asserts that the alienation or exchange of “property 
is so important in our American society that many Americans are apt to 
view ‘property’ as synonymous with ‘commodity.’” 166 “[This] wasn’t 
always so.”167 Individual preferences may be expressed through market 
alienation of property; however, not all property fits this market exchange 
model.168 The value placed on the property by the owner may not be 
correlative to market criteria. This property has a unique, personal, and 
nonreoccurring history that forms the basis for establishing a noneconomic 
value for the property. For example, the house where one was born has 
historical significance for a family and may escape an economic valuation 
framework.169 Or an “heirloom” may be a piece of jewelry passed down 
through the generations from mothers to daughters and theoretically, has 
no economic exchange value which will equal the psychological or 
emotional value attached to the item.170 Scholars have noted that fidelity to 
a spouse or loyalty to a friend defies a single metric of valuation.171 One 
may value fidelity and loyalty in a manner that precludes an exchange 
based on money.172 Others have argued that “friendship is more valuable 
than any amount of money or in other words, that the value of friendship is 
incomparably greater.”173 One does not have to agree that the value of 
 
 
 166. Gregory Alexander, Property as Propriety, 77 NEB. L. REV. 667, 668 (1998) (discussing the 
relatively new development of the conception of property as a commodity). 
 167. Id. (discussing the conception of property as a commodity a realtively new development). 
 168. Notwithstanding challenges to the “free market” model of property, “[it] has a life of its own 
and continues to dominate legal discourse.” Joseph Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN 
L. REV. 611, 636 (1988) (discussing limits to market theory for property rights and suggesting a 
reliance theory for property rights, analogous to the reliance theory used in torts and contract law). See 
also Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). 
 169. The dissent in Chuck v. Gomes eloquently articulates why the pecuniary loss standard is 
unable to fairly adjudicate needs of a local population. 532 P.2d 657, 660 (Haw. 1975) (Richardson, 
C.J., dissenting). In Chuck v. Gomes,  the majority affirmed the trial court’s order of sale of real 
property owned by nine tenants in common despite the Commissioner’s report that partition in-kind 
was feasible. Id. The dissent argued that the discretion of the courts to order partition by sale should be 
narrow considering Hawaiian culture and the importance of retaining the ownership of real property in 
one’s family line. See id. at 661. The dissent supported its position by noting the common law favored 
partition in -kind and by arguing that the individual’s right to possess familial lands to perpetuate the 
homestead is integral to Hawaiian culture. 
 170. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 3 (1996). 
 171. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958 (1982); Cass 
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH . L. REV. 779, 801 (1994). 
 172. See Sunstein, supra  note 171, at 813. 
 173. Donald H. Regan, Authority Value: Reflections on Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 995, 1058 (1989). 
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friendship is incomparably greater than money to conclude that friendship, 
like loyalty or fidelity, defy a commensurability framework.174 They 
“cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our 
considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized.”175 
Radin argues that “[m]ost people possess certain objects they feel are 
almost part of themselves . . . they are part of the way we constitute 
ourselves as continuing personal entities.”176 Radin points out that certain 
goods are intrinsic to one’s sense of identity and personhood, and that to 
assume these goods are exchangeable commodities “does violence to the 
self.”177  
Much the same as friendship, loyalty, or fidelity, historical or personal 
attachment to land may be inside of one’s “self-construction” or “self-
identity.”178 Scholars have recognized the continuing cross-cultural 
importance of land to one’s sense of self.179 The “homeplace” may be 
more important to African Americans because of their struggle to achieve 
land ownership, and because of their need for refuge, solace, and self-
determination in a persistently discriminatory social landscape.180 For 
many African Americans the homeplace is a place that can be created and 
controlled as a place of dignity, something so often denied African 
Americans in society at large.181 Thus, land is not fungible and defies 
valuation along one common metric. Land as “sacred”182 or invaluable is 
 
 
 174. See Sunstein, supra  note 171, at 813. 
 175. See id. at 796. 
 176. See RADIN, supra  note 170. 
 177. “Human values are plural and diverse.” See RADIN, supra note 170, at 74-75. Thus, “human 
goods are not commensurable.” Id. “Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost a part of 
themselves . . . . One may gauge the strength or significance of someone’s relationship with an object 
by the kind of pain that would be occasioned by its loss.” Id. Radin argues that the item is “closely 
related to one’s personhood” when replacement of the object will not relieve the pain of associated 
with the loss. See id. The individual’s perceived status in society, which is attached to the property, 
defies a purely economic valuation. See id . 
 178. See id. 
 179. See, e.g., Joyce Quiring Erickson, On Being at Home, 43 CROSSCURRENTS 235, 237 (1997) 
(citing E. RELPH, PLACE AND PLACELESSNESS 39 (1976)) (noting that “[h]ome is the foundation of our 
identity as individuals and as members of a community, the dwelling-place of being . . . an 
irreplaceable centre of significance.”) 
 180. See FEAGIN, supra  note 4, at 224 (“To black families, home represents one of the few 
anchors available to them in an often hostile white-dominated world. Home is for African Americans 
the one place that is theirs to control and that can give them refuge from racial maltreatment in the 
outside world.”) See also  STACK , supra  note 70 (recounting the stories of many African Americans 
who return to the rural, poor South to reclaim their histories, to reconnect with families, and to 
rediscover their identities by confronting their past). 
 181. See FEAGIN, supra  note 4, at 224-25. 
 182. Americans have with notable consistency accorded property an almost sacred position in 
American culture. See ALEXIS DET OCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA  236 (Phillips Bradley ed., 
Vintage Books 1990) (1840). “In no other country in the world is the love of property more active and 
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not a unique or new concept.183 Land symbolizes and represents a diverse 
number of things for different people at different times.184 Historically, 
there is much support for the position that the value of land is not 
determined only by its use for economic gain.185 Outside the boundaries of 
western society, sustenance and birthright have endured as valuations of 
land far longer than have property assessments, possession, and market 
values.186 The perspectives of indigenous people 187 and 
environmentalists188 are examples of alternatives to a purely economic 
approach to land valuation. Other scholars have noted instances where 
individuals hold certain noneconomic goals as cherished above all else. In 
some contexts, this has been explained by the scholars as the desire for 
esteem, status, group identity, group interest,189 or group loyalty.190  
 
 
more anxious than in the United States . . . .” Id. 
 183. See Rudner, supra  note 149; Lewis, supra  note 149. 
 184. See generally Rudner, supra  note 149 (arguing the importance of recognizing noneconomic 
land values found in Indian culture). 
 185. See Alexander, supra  note 166, at 668. (discussing “property as the material foundation for 
creating and maintaining the proper social order”). 
 186. See Rudner, supra  note 149. 
 187. Native Americans have a close relationship with their physical environment and the land 
itself. Land, for indigenous people, is sacred—something to be cherished and respected. Id. Many 
Native Americans live in close connect ion with the earth and are cognizant of it rhythms and 
resources. In many ways, they define themselves in relation to the land and by the sacred places that 
bind and shape their world. Id. Their traditions and religious beliefs are inseparable from the land. See 
Hallendy, supra  note 149; Trebbe, supra note 149. The revered connection that Native Americans 
have with their land and environment is reflected in their persistence in challenging the destruction of 
specific geographic sites. Mount Graham in Arizona (which is considered sacred by the San Carlos 
Apaches), Red Butte (held sacred by the Havasupai), and the Big Horn Medicine Wheel in Wyoming 
(held sacred by the Blackfeet people) are examples of three sites which have been targeted for 
capitalist use. See Trebbe, supra  note 149, at 1. Mount Graham was chosen by the University of 
Arizona as the site of seven telescopes. See Rudner, supra note 149, at 10. Red Butte is now the site of 
an uranium development and the Big Horn Medicine Wheel is a prime source of oil and natural gas 
deposits. See id . In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the Supreme Court 
failed to recognize the noneconomic value of the land as sacred to the Native Americans for religious 
purposes. 485 U.S. 439 (1987). Instead, the Court applied an economic test. Several California tribes 
tried to block construction of a logging road through an old growth forest central to their ceremonial 
practices. See id. at 443. The Court held that the First Amendment does not protect native sacred sites 
from being destroyed so long as the intent of the party using the land is not to prevent Native 
Americans from practicing their religion. See id. at 450-51. 
 188. The environmental perspective is consistent with Native American views, although it does 
not define land as sacred. The environmentalist groups, however, may have different strategies and 
even different motivations. The primary distinctions between the groups has been based on their 
philosophies. Two distinct philosophies which operate within the initial movement are anthropocentric 
and nonanthropocentric philosophies. See Kline & Mazzotta, supra  note 149, at 71. See also D. E. 
Booth, supra  note 149, at 59; See also  ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1946) 
(parenthetical).  
 189. Improving conditions or maintaining a hierarchy which supports a feeling of superior group 
status can become the reward and motivation for individual action. For example, in the 1960s, 
individual African Americans participated in social protest and risked economic loss, incarceration, 
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The economic valuation process reflects a hierarchy where market 
activity is implicitly privileged, and psychological and emotional 
components are undervalued. Partition sales of family owned property 
have the potential not just to reinforce this hierarchy, but to capitalize on 
it. The values of co-owners who do not share these assumptions about 
value are marginalized. Their claims are deemed less worthy due to their 
failure to communicate their value in financial terms.  
Scholars debate whether “law and economics” principles are the 
appropriate model on which to base legal rules in certain contexts.191 
Much of the debate centers on whether formalistic deduction based on 
predetermined assumptions, as applied in law and economics to determine 
human disputes, achieves the highest utility in determining human 
disputes or is, at least, the most practical solution.192 Human motivation 
and “human experience,” although undeniably “real,” cannot be easily 
quantified or measured. An approach which focuses on economic 
efficiency may produce a more quantifiable, but not necessarily more 
equitable, result. In spite of the favored status asserted by the courts and 
some scholars, the economic efficiency framework must be viewed with 
some skepticism.  
3. Contested Assumptions  
Even if one accepts the notion of a single metric and therefore, rejects 
the arguments for incommensurability, problems remain with employing a 
 
 
and even death to enjoy an improvement in group status. See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING 
THE WATERS (1988) (tracing the risks and challenges faced by Martin Luther King, Jr. and his 
supporters during the Civil Rights Movement). Thus, improving the condition, not of the individual, 
but of the family, the next generation, or the homogeneous unit, may be a sufficient motivation to 
explain the desire to retain title to land and forego immediate individual economic gain. 
 190. Consider the possible economic consequences of these words:  
Standing in the presence of this multitude, sobered with the responsibility of the message I 
delivered to the young men of the South, I declared that the truth above all others to be worn 
unsullied and sacred in your hearts, to be surrendered to no force, sold for no price, 
compromised in no necessity, but cherished and defended as the covenant of your prosperity, 
and the pledge of peace to your children, is that the white race must  dominate forever in the 
South, because it is the white race, and superior to that race by which its supremacy is 
threatened.  
HENRY W. GRADY, T HE NEW SOUTH AND OTHER ADDRESSES 55 (1969). 
 191. See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 161; Thomas Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and 
Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071 (1996) (arguing that the economic theory of pragmatism 
offers insights useful for constructing legal theory); Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law and 
Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815 (1990) (discussing whether the economic theory of positivism has an 
analog in legal theory).  
 192. See RADIN, supra  note 170, at 16-45. 
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market model to assess value.193 An offer-price criteria is often employed 
as a proxy to determine an individual’s value of the relevant property.194 
For example, the basic premise of employing an offer-price criteria is that 
the interest holder who values the property more, will offer (in an auction 
or other market setting) to pay more for the property. Efficient markets for 
all goods will therefore sort out the interest which values the property the 
most.195 A number of scholars have argued that this proxy is subject to a 
series of limiting parameters which makes it at a minimum indeterminate 
as a reliable surrogate for revealing the interest holder’s intensity of 
preference.196 For example, consider the “Widow’s Mite Paradox” as an 
example of the limitation of the offer-price as a measure of intensity in 
valuation questions.197 
In the “Widows Mite Paradox”198 scenario, I assume that Interest A’s 
total wealth is 5000 dollars while Interest B’s total wealth is 20,000 
dollars. Interest A and Interest B are tenants in common. Interest B 
ruptures the relationship through partition and the property is ordered sold 
at auction. Interest A offers 5000 dollars, representing 100% of her wealth, 
to purchase the property. Interest B is prepared to offer no more than 5001 
dollars, representing 25% of her wealth. At auction, Interest B receives the 
property. But can one deduce that Interest B, by bidding more in dollars, 
in fact values the property more than Interest A? What I term the “Widows 
Mite Paradox” clearly indicates that analysis beyond the surface facts 
(amount of bid in dollars) necessitates an answer of “No.” Interest A, by 
offering 5000 dollars, was willing to pay all that she owned in order to 
keep the property; whereas Interest B, in offering 5001 dollars, was only 
willing to pay 25% of her wealth to keep the property. Interest A values 
 
 
 193. A number of scholars have agreed that given the number and complexities of valuation 
frameworks, a simplifying single metric should be used as a proxy for all the other valuations 
frameworks. See BECKER, supra  note 163, at 8. 
 194. See Landes and Posner, supra  note 164, at 327-39, for a concrete application of this 
argument. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law and Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 293, 
325-30 (1992); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect , 20 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 
225, 238-43 (1991) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Legal Policy]; Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401-10 (1981). 
 197. See Cotter, supra  note 191, at 2127. See also Hovenkamp, Legal Policy, supra note 196, at 
239. 
 198. This is based on the Widow’s offering story in the New Testament of the Christian Bible. 
Jesus sat watching the rich put significant amounts into the offering containers. Then a poor widow 
approached and offered only two copper coins. Jesus said, “Truly I tell you, this poor widow has put in 
more than all of them; for they contribute out of their abundance, but she out of her poverty put in all 
the living that she had.” Luke 21:1-4. 
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the property more on an alternative method of measuring intensity based 
on the amount of the bids. The amount of any bid may only reflect that 
one interest holder has more wealth or access to more resources and not 
the true value the bidder places in the property. The suggested use of 
alternative value frameworks may be subjected to similar critiques. This 
leaves the responsibility of finding a suitable metric with the court. If all 
value frameworks are subject to some critique, then no metric may be 
appropriate for universal application. 
In partition cases where the property is ordered sold, it may appear that 
awarding the property to the highest bidder at auction is a neutral, 
objective, and value-free metric which will produce an economically 
efficient use of the property. However, as demonstrated above, this 
approach excludes other, potentially valid frameworks held by some of the 
co-owners. In this context, where ownership of real property is 
involuntarily converted into personal property through state power, all 
value frameworks should be considered equally viable especially if it 
allows a co-owner to protect their interest in the property.  
Property is a scarce resource which is traditionally protected in the law, 
except in cases involving public need and compelling state interest.199 
Here there is no public need which compels the forced sale of the property. 
A sale of the property is set out in state partition statutes as an 
extraordinary remedy.200 For courts to allow a purely economic valuation 
to establish the “injury” and to determine who gets the property does 
violence to the intent and spirit of the law. Historically, partition sales 
were ordered in extraordinary circumstances when a division could not be 
clearly established.201 The circumventing of this intent by an outside 
interest, supported by the courts, may be legal, but it is not objective or 
fair to all interests in the property. The devastating impact of this liability 
regime in judicial partition has a devastating impact on particular 
segments of society and specifically African Americans. 
III. THE AFRICAN AMERICAN CASE: LAND LOSS 
These facts suggest that the overall consequences of the phenomenon 
described in Parts I-III of this Article can be usefully viewed through the 
lens of race. These facts, taken together, support the proposition that 
 
 
 199. See Epstein, supra note 49. 
 200. See generally supra Part.II.B and notes 104-09.  
 201. See generally supra  Part II.A (discussing the common law origin and purpose of partition 
sales in the United States).  
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African Americans as a group have suffered disproportionately from the 
combined effects of the judicial doctrine favoring forced sales, the 
exclusive reliance on economic valuation favoring forced sales, and the 
use of nonmarket auctions to compensate dispossessed co-owners. 
The history of African Americans in this country first as property,202 
their struggle to acquire land, and their subsequent land loss is well 
documented. The real and undesirable impact that this community has 
suffered makes the search for contributing causes worthwhile. Although 
judicial partition is only one of a list of causes of land loss, this area is a 
good example of how many of the causes intersect. Second, African 
Americans as a group are poorer than whites as a group, 203 and are poorer 
in terms of real property ownership and wealth.204 A corollary to this 
second fact is that in part, as a result of this relative economic status and 
other negative experiences with the legal system, African Americans tend 
not to engage in estate planning;205 thus disproportionately, their real 
property passes under the laws of intestacy, making it more likely for 
property to be owned under the co-ownership forms that are subject to 
partition.206 Discrimination in opportunities for land acquisition has 
presented a major and enduring hurdle for African Americans. Factors 
such as restrictive covenants, steering by realtors, redlining by lending 
institutions, and discrimination in the approval process for mortgages have 
contributed to this on going dilemma of land acquisition and retention.207 
Finally, cultural and sociological studies suggest that African Americans 
value land ownership beyond the market value that the relevant land 
commands.208 Thus, African Americans are more likely to be caught in the 
 
 
 202. Thrust into a new land as chattel, African Americans, like the rest of American society, 
began to express their individuality through the acquisition of property and other forms of wealth. See 
SCHWENINGER, supra  note 13, at 144-45. However, unlike the rest of society, individual property 
ownership became a necessity for African Americans instead of a mere desire. See id. Individual 
property ownership became a necessity because “slaves saw liquid capital not only as a means to 
secure freedom, but also as a means to attach their paternity—and hence, their identity as persons—to 
something even their masters would have to respect.” See id . at 11.  
 203. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO , supra  note 2, at 102 tbl. 5.2. 
 204. See id. at 106 tbl. 5.3. 
 205. See STACK , supra  note 70, at 44. 
 206. By engaging in estate planning, individuals may avoid co-ownership and avail themselves of 
trusts and other planning tools to distribute their property. Even though co-ownership may be chosen 
in a will or other estate planning device, the phenomenon of fragmentation that occurs over several 
generations in the absence of any estate planning is far less likely to occur. 
 207. See JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS OF 
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 4-5, 44-45, 187-89 (1995). 
 208. See, e.g., FEAGIN, supra  note 4, at 224 (noting the cultural importance of land ownership for 
African Americans). See also  T HORDIS SIMONSEN, YOU MAY PLOW HERE  19-21 (W.W. Norton & 
Company 1986) (providing a narrative study of Sara Brooks, an African American woman living on a 
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web of partition law that leads to forced sale. In the judicial proceedings 
for sale, they receive compensation that not only may fail to reflect the 
nonmarket value of the property lost but also may fail to accurately reflect 
fair market value.209  
For any group, the loss of property historically held by family would be 
considered a painful break with a valued family asset. African American 
property ownership is considered by many as all but a sacred 
phenomenon.210 Despite numerous obstacles, newly freed African 
Americans demonstrated and modern African Americans still 
demonstrate,211 a great determination to accumulate property.212 Indeed, 
“perhaps no Americans can better understand the meaning of owning 
property than those who had been considered a ‘species of property’ 
themselves.”213  
For African Americans, the viewpoint of land as “sacred” is directly 
tied to a people’s movement from slavery to freedom.214 In judicial 
partition cases where the retention or divestment of land title is 
determined, a valuation framework which only employs an economic 
model does violence to the historical significance land has played in the 
lives of African Americans.215 Land for many African Americans may be 
the most important symbol of achieving some level of equality in 
American society.216 In view of this, any process that precipitates land loss 
must be carefully evaluated, critiqued, and scrutinized. Status and self-
esteem are naturally attached to those things which people are able to 
 
 
farm in the rural South). Simonsen notes that Sara Brooks’ father gained both independence and the 
respect of neighbors, black and white, through continued land ownership. See id. 
 209. See, e.g. Fine v. Sharer, 571 P.2d 1252 (Or. 1977). 
 210. See generally Edward Magdol, An American Village Movement, in A RIGHT TO LAND, 
ESSAYS ON THE FREEDMEN’S COMMUNITY  180 (1975). 
 211. See generally infra  Part I and accompanying notes (explaining the hardships African 
Americans experience in attempting to acquire property). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1993) 
(attempting to eradicate discrimination in property ownership). 
 212. See § 1982. 
 213. See SCHWENINGER, supra note 13, at 144. 
 214. African Americans were torn from Africa, their native land, and taken to the New World to 
commence their new lives as slaves. See id. at 9. Although the early African Americans were 
descendants from numerous African tribes and thus, shared great cultural differences, they did share 
one cultural trait. See id. at 10. In America, the soon-to-be African Americans experienced a different 
type of property ownership that was enjoyed in the New World. See id. In the New World, the 
colonists enjoyed individual property ownership. See id. However, in Africa, Africans enjoyed 
communal property ownership.  
 215. See SCHWENINGER, supra note 13, at 145. 
 216. See Lester Salamon, Family Assistance—The Stakes in the Rural South, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 
Feb. 20, 1971, vol. 164, at 17. 
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acquire; they are symbols of our position in society.217 Acquisition of the 
“homeplace” or productive land was the first symbolic step toward true 
liberty or freedom for many African Americans following 
Reconstruction.218 Individual property ownership was viewed as a 
necessity for adaptation and citizenship.219 The psychological and 
emotional significance of retaining a particular property is immeasurable 
in financial terms and may “[do] violence” to the individuals whose 
cultural and historical ties bind them so closely to the property.220 
The goal of property ownership by African Americans has continued to 
be a contested possibility.221 Post-Reconstruction, the ownership of 
productive property conferred independence and stability on African 
Americans in a culture that sought to maintain and enforce their heretofore 
status of inferior and dependent quasi-citizens. Not only was the struggle 
to gain ownership or property difficult but equally problematic was the 
struggle to preserve their title to the property.222 The independence of 
 
 
 217. Cultural transformations were imperative for the first African Americans because “[t]he more 
their unique culture differed from that of their master the more they were ‘immune from the control of 
whites’ and the more they ‘gained in personal autonomy and positive self concepts.’” SCHWENINGER, 
supra  note 13, at 29. However, as would be expected, the cultures of the new African Americans 
gradually transformed. One such cultural transformation included their philosophies about property 
ownership. See SOLTOW, supra  note 202, at 76, 84, 186. 
 218. See Magdol, supra note 210, at 175-80. 
 219. Schweninger notes: 
It was not merely observing Europeans and envying their wealth and comfort, or seeing how 
their accumulations had made them independent and powerful, or even accepting new 
definitions for success and self-esteem, although all of these probably influenced to one 
degree or another the changing attitudes of blacks. In the brutal and exploitative new setting 
they found that survival depended not so much on communal harmony as on individual 
ingenuity. Even those who could never relinquish the hope of someday returning to the life 
they had been forced to abandon realized that perhaps the only way to make their dream a 
reality was to make adaptations to their new land.  
SCHWENINGER, supra note 13, at 11. 
 220. See Radin, supra  note 170, at 958. 
 221. See FONER, supra  note 11, at 102-10; WILLIE LEE ROSE , REHEARSAL FOR RECONSTRUCTION 
(1976) (providing a detailed exploration of freedmen and land); SCHWEINGER, supra note 13, at 97-
141. 
 222. See WEARE , supra  note 17, at 3-8, 13-14. Given the historic segregation within the rural 
areas of the South, African American communities developed a complete network or infrastructure of 
associated relationships to provide mutual aid and opportunity to its members.  See id. at 6-11. 
Churches, burial societies, and cooperatives of various kinds created opportunities for African 
Americans who desired to carve out a higher quality of life. See id. at 6-7. These associations also 
were independent locations where African Americans could talk freely about the individual issues or 
the intersection of politics, race, and economics. See id. They were often hotbeds of intellectual 
discussion and potential launching points for resistance to segregation and limitations placed on 
economic advancement. See id. at 8. At the center of this network of associations and organizations 
were the African American property owners. African American landowners and property owners 
provided significant leadership and stability to the ongoing effort of these associations to aid the 
African American community. See id. at 52-56. See also LERONE BENNET,  JR., BEFORE THE 
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landowners and business owners provided ample inducement and basis for 
the majority power structures at the local and state level to adopt legal and 
extra-legal methods to undermine the ability of this group to maintain 
itself and grow.223 
Attempts by African Americans to protect their property rights in the 
courts were also problematic.224 Chances of success for African Americans 
in legal actions involving contested issues against a white opponent were 
low.225 They could not depend on an impartial administration of justice.226 
Opportunities were further limited by community control. Given the 
closed nature of the relationships in many towns and cities, whites who 
dared to break with convention by selling property to African Americans 
or providing financing for the purchase of property could face harsh 
repercussions which included ostracism inside their own community.227 As 
punishment, they could effectively be removed from future business 
 
 
MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICA  214-54 (6th ed. 1987); W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK 
RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA  601-36 (1935) (discussing the difficulties African Americans faced 
during Reconstruction when they attempted to obtain possession and title to lands, as well as the right 
to vote attendant with land tenure). 
 223. Whites mounted campaigns in an attempt to keep African Americans from achieving any 
sense of land ownership and possession. See WHITELAW REID, AFTER THE WAR: A TOUR OF 
SOUTHERN STATES 1865-1866, at 564-65 (C. Vann. Woodward ed., Harper Torchbooks 1965) (1866). 
For example, in 1865 the state of Mississippi prohibited “any freedman, free Negro or mulatto” from 
renting or leasing any land or tenements except within the limits of where local authorities could 
control and oversee such rental and lease agreements. Id. In other states, whites entered into private 
agreements prohibiting each other from selling, renting or leasing their property to African Americans. 
See id. Whites also lashed out against African Americans who succeeded in spite of the odds to obtain 
property in a time that can be described as a reign of terror. In July of 1919 in Chicago, white mobs 
brutally attacked African American neighborhoods, killing and wounding 537 residents and leaving an 
estimated 1,000 homeless. See MAXINE D. JONES ET. AL., A DOCUMENTED HISTORY OF THE INCIDENT 
WHICH OCCURED AT ROSEWOOD, FLORIDA IN JANUARY , 1923, at 94 (1993). In July of 1917 in East 
St. Louis, Illinois, homes were indiscriminately torched as a result of competition for jobs. See id. at 
89. In November of 1920 in Ocoee, Florida, six African American residents were killed; twenty-five 
homes, two churches, and a lodge were destroyed. See id. at 97. In June of 1921, a section of Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, where African Americans resided was set aflame, leaving thousands homeless. See id. at 
98. White mobs destroyed approximately eighteen homes during the Rosewood incident. See id. at 
421-22. After two weeks of terror, all of the African American residents of the town fled, surrendering 
all property, including their homes. See id. Most of the houses and personal property were burned. See 
id. at 428-29. These homes belonged to John Wesley Bradley, George Bradley, Mary Ann Hall, Laura 
Jones, James Carrier, Sarah Carrier, Aaron Carrier, Hardee Davis, John Coleman, Virginia Smith, 
James Hall, Lizzie Screen, Sam Carter, Cornelia Carter, Ransom Edwards, May Ann Hayward, John 
McCoy, Ed Bradley, Perry Goins, Sam King, and Lexie Gordon. See id. According to Moore, these 
homes were relatively substantial dwellings and well furnished. See id. 
 224. See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, WORSE T HAN SLAVERY  25-27 (1996); NIEMAN, supra note 6, at 
114-47 (describing the difficulties African Americans encountered advancing their civil rights and 
challenging segregation in the courts). 
 225. See LEON F. LITWACK , T ROUBLE IN MIND 246-57 (1998). 
 226. See id. 
 227. See supra  note 223, at 564-65. 
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dealings which could impact their own livelihood. As a consequence, only 
exceptionally independent whites would risk their status in the community 
to act on behalf of African Americans, even in the courts.228 A perversion 
of this phenomenon was the accepted notion that whites could safely act 
on behalf of “good darkies.”229 
The cumulative impact of this “raced” system is impossible to 
determine. However, one consequence was avoidance of the legal system. 
With the risk of losing so high, African Americans with property issues 
often did not choose going to court as a viable option in many instances.230 
Limited resources and a legitimate distrust of the legal system provided 
the rationale for many families to allow the intergenerational transfer of 
property to proceed through intestate succession. Many African Americans 
“came to perceive the law and its enforcers as an outside alien force.”231 
Without recourse to the courts for probate, the passing of their property 
interests as “heir property” was a safer alternative and would in effect keep 
the property in the family.232 This system of transfer created its own set of 
practical and legal problems.233 
As property passed down to each generation through intestate 
succession, the ownership interests tended to multiply and disperse over 
time. Instead of protecting the property, the multiplication of interests 
created potential vulnerabilities. Many possibilities for rupturing of the 
tenancy in common are present. For example, one of the interest holders 
could sell his interest to a purchaser who does not desire to continue 
ownership as a tenant in common,234 or a disagreement over the desired 
 
 
 228. See id. 
 229. NEIL R.MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY 118 (1990). 
 230. LITWACK , supra note 225, at 277-78. 
 231. Id. at  277. 
 232. The term “heir property” is commonly used in the African American community to denote 
land held by the legal heirs of the deceased under an intestate succession statute. See STACK, supra 
note 70, at 44. The heirs hold the property as tenants in common. See id. Each heir has an undivided 
interest. See id. 
 233. See Wayne Moore, Improving the Delivery of Legal Services for the Elderly: A 
Comprehensive Approach, 41 EMORY L.J. 805, 813 (1992) (citing an American Association of Retired 
Persons survey that found African Americans lagged substantially behind whites in utilizing estate 
planning tools). Specifically, the survey noted that African Americans were less likely to have wills 
and durable powers of attorney. Id. 
 234. A common scenario appears in many partition cases involving heir property owned by 
African Americans. A party interested in purchasing property in a rural area researches the ownership 
record of the specific tract. The desire to obtain this tract may stem from many different sources such 
as speculation on possible development opportunities, or the consolidation or extension of adjoining 
land. The research would indicate that the particular property is owned by a number of heirs as tenants 
in common. The purchaser may contact one or more of the heirs to discuss a possible purchase. If the 
entire group does not agree, the purchaser may still purchase the interest of any heir willing to sell 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss3/2
p737 Taylor.doc  4/26/01  4:44 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2000] THROUGH A COLORED LOOKING GLASS 777 
 
 
 
 
use of the property may develop between co-tenants and to resolve the 
dilemma any of the co-owners may seek a partition. If the court found that 
an in-kind division is infeasible, the entire tract could be lost to a 
nonfamily member in a judicial sale.235 Selling the property to the highest 
bidder works to the disadvantage of a less wealthier party desiring to 
retain ownership.236 Due to this and other factors, the judicial sale of 
property in partition actions has contributed significantly to property loss 
in the African American community.237 
Although African Americans in the Twentieth Century owned more 
land than their ancestors, the security they enjoyed in their property 
ownership did not improve drastically. The incidence of overt acts of 
racial violence may have declined over the years, but the African 
American struggle to acquire and maintain property still persists.238 The 
present day struggle often takes the form of discrimination in lending.239 
 
 
their individual interest. The purchaser then becomes a tenant in common with the other heirs. As a 
cotenant, the purchaser may then request a partition of the property and assert that an in-kind division 
is infeasible. If the court finds that in-kind division is impossible without injury to a cotenant’s 
interest, then a judicial sale of the entire tract is ordered. This injury is, in most cases, defined in 
economic terms. The sale is noticed within the legal requirements of the partition statute and all 
interested parties are given the opportunity to bid on the property. The highest bidder is awarded title 
to the property and the other cotenants are paid in proportion to their representative interest. The 
relative wealth and access to resources greatly impacts the outcome of these cases. See Telephone 
Interview with Jerry Pennick, Federation of Southern Cooperatives and Director, The Land Loss Fund, 
Inc. (July 17, 1999); supra  Part II.C.  
 235. See supra  Part II.B for a detailed discussion of the statutory standards for a judicial partition. 
 236. Whites have substantially higher incomes than African Americans and the wealth gap is 
significantly larger. This gap works as an impediment to African Americans who seek to retain their 
property if the highest bidder is awarded the property. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO , supra note 2, at 203 
tbl. A6.3 (providing a detailed analysis of the income and wealth disparities between black and white 
married households); T.J. Eller & Wallace Fraser, Asset Ownership of Households, in 1993 U.S. 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS pt. 70-74, at 1, 8-10 (1995). 
 237. It is estimated that over one-half of all land lost by African Americans in the South over the 
past thirty years may be attributed to judicial sales in partition proceedings. See Telephone Interview 
with Jerry Pennick, supra  note 234. 
 238. Congress enacted federal legislation prohibiting such discrimination in the 1960s. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1982 (1993) (“All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and 
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real 
and personal property.”). 
 239. The executive branch also issued an executive order in an attempt to squash such 
discrimination. See Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (Nov. 20, 1962). Executive Order 
No. 11,063 acknowledged that “discriminatory policies and practices based upon race, color, creed, or 
national origin now operate to deny many Americans the benefits of housing . . . .” Id. The Executive 
Order then explains that such discrimination “result[s] in segregated patterns of housing and 
necessarily produce[s] other forms of discrimination and segregation which deprive many Americans 
an equal opportunity to exercise their unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness 
. . . .” Id. Accordingly, the executive branch directed all of its departments “to take all action necessary 
and appropriate to prevent discrimination because of race . . . in the sale, leasing, rental, or other 
disposition of residential property . . . or in the use of occupancy thereof . . . .” Id. Furthermore, the 
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Without access to adequate lending sources due to discrimination, African 
Americans are once again disadvantaged. In judicial partition cases, the 
outcome is directly impacted by the parties’ distribution of wealth, who 
are attempting to secure funds in order to competitively participate in the 
bidding process when the property is auctioned at the judicial sale. This 
factor, combined with the integration of racial discrimination infused into 
facially “neutral mechanisms,” produces a discriminatory dynamic which 
works against the African American interest holder.240 The result is 
predetermined by the lending institutions’ utilization of discriminatory 
practices in their lending decisions, refusing to make loans to African 
American family members. Study after study documents the persistence of 
discrimination in lending practices. 241 Next, the tendency of local 
appraisers to “color” the appraisal of property held by African Americans 
plays a contributing role in this rupturing process. 242 The threat of 
intimidation is also a factor. 243 Family members seeking to fight the sale 
may face threats and intimidation.244 The disparate number of African 
American lawyers, judges, appraisers, and bankers also works against a 
true representation of the best interests of the African American interest 
holders. Their valuation of property may not be culturally understood or 
worse—may be understood and then devalued. Thus, even at the dawn of 
the Twenty-First Century, African Americans are still denied many 
meaningful opportunities for property ownership.245 Despite the enormity 
 
 
executive branch amended this executive order in 1980 and 1994. 24 C.F.R. § 107.10 (2000). The need 
to amend Executive Order 11,063 as recently as 1994 is proof that discriminat ion in the disposition of 
property still persists and still requires a remedy. 
 240. See supra  Part II.C.3. 
 241. See Russell Sage Foundation, Projects of Special Interest: Preliminary Findings from the 
Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, available at http://www.russelsage.org/special_interest/ 
point_8_preferences.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2000); FEAGIN, supra  note 4, at 249-52 (discussing 
lending and housing discrimination). The federal government has taken an active role in litigating 
lending discrimination cases. See, e.g., United States v. Decatur Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n, 
Atlanta, Consent Decree, No. 1-92-CV-219-CAM (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 1992). In Decatur Federal 
Savings, the government brought its first suit against a mortgage lender for an alleged “pattern of 
practice” of violations of the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. See id. The 
federal government alleged that Decatur discriminated against black applicants, and also discouraged 
black applications by excluding minority areas from its service area, opened new branches only in 
white areas, closed branches in black neighborhoods, employed few blacks, and directed its marketing 
at white customers and neighborhoods. Id. at 429. 
 242. See Decatur Federal Savings,  Consent Decree, No. 1-92-CV-219-CAM, at 61. 
 243. See, e.g., ROBERT W. LAKE, T HE NEW SUBURBANITES, 77-105 (1981) (describing white 
intimadation of blacks in the housing desegregation and integration context); ARNOLD SCHUCHTER, 
WHITE POWER, BLACK FREEDOM 60-61 (1968) (discussing the threats of violence faced by civil rights 
workers led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in Chicago). 
 244. See SCHUCHTER, supra  note 243, at 60-61. 
 245. Today the pattern of racial and class inequity still remains within American society. 
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of the record of progress and determination, some African Americans are 
mired in the intractable practices and vestiges of a system which grounds 
in beliefs of inferiority and promotes second-class citizenship.246 In the 
eyes of many, one of the most valuable attributes of citizenship—property 
ownership—is threatened by ongoing discrimination in lending and the 
forced partition of jointly held property.247  
In this article, I have argued that the African American family’s248 
 
 
Economically, banks still ‘redline’ communities, denying credit and capital to black consumers and 
entrepreneurs. See David A. Harris, Jr., Using the Law to Break Discriminatory Barriers to Fair 
Lending for Home Ownership , 22 N.C. CENT. L.J. 101, 103-06 (1996). There is no denying the fact 
that the civil rights movement and subsequent anti-discrimination legislation sought to balance the 
playing field for African Africans, particularly in employment and property ownership. See id. De jure 
segregation was banned, and now many African Americans enjoy opportunities which were only 
dreams for their ancestors. With this in mind, it is impossible to deny the progress made inside the 
African American community. This progress best demonstrates the strong and unwavering 
determination of a people to participate fully and equally in the life of this nation. 
 246. See Craig-Taylor, supra  note 12, at 59-64. 
 247. This problem is highlighted by the recent complaints of thousands of African American 
farmers alleging discrimination in lending practices by the United States Department of Agriculture. 
See Pigford et al. v. USDA, Consent Decree, No. 97-1978(Plf) (D.C. Cir. Apr. 14, 1999). Fifteen years 
earlier, a Civil Rights Commission report stated that the Farmers Home Administration “may be 
involved in the very kind of racial discrimination that it should be seeking to correct.” U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRICULTURE , CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE: A REPORT BY 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION T EAM (February 1997) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS]. Nothing was done to 
stop the problem. The lending bias initiated a cycle of failure for African American farmers. The 
claims are varied but all of the claims have a common thread—disparate treatment based on race. See 
Pigford et al., Consent Decree, No. 97-1978(Plf). The farmers assert that they were discouraged from 
applying, their pleas for loans were ignored, and their applications were delayed as white farmers 
received loans and assistance in a much more timely manner. See id. The delays and denials caused the 
loss of land which had been in the families of these farmers for years. See id. Land had to be auctioned 
and sold while the farms waited for help which did not come. See id. A class action lawsuit has been 
initiated for over 2500 African American farmers from Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas and Virginia, alleging violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Civil 
Rights Act. See id. Bolstering the farmers complaints is a 1997 study undertaken by the Department of 
Agriculture that found African American farmers being denied credit they needed to sustain their 
farming operations and defrauded by agricultural agents because of the color of their skin. See CIVIL 
RIGHTS, supra . 
 248. I am narrowing the scope of my argument to family-owned properties since opponents will 
contend that adopting a property rule across the board would not be economically efficient and would 
impede development. However, where developers exploit families, the argument of economic 
efficiency has no merit as the preservat ion of the family is a deeply rooted value in this country. See 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989). 
 Additionally, the focus on families should not violate the equal protection clause. See RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWACK , CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch.14, § 3 (5th ed. 1995); see also Lyng v. 
Castilllo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (upholding a rule that offered different welfare benefits based on family 
status). First, individuals who do not own family-owned prperty do not belong to a protected class. See 
ROTUNDA & NOWACK , supra , at 608. Accordingly, a statute remedying the above problem would only 
need to withstand a rationality review. See id . at 601. Because the legislature would attempt to protect 
property rights, the statute would be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Second, 
the above problem arises as a result of intestate succession. Under intestate succession, property is 
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entitlement to their family-owned properties should be protected by 
property rules. Although their interests are initially protected by property 
rules, somehow their protection is shifted to that of liability rules. To 
assure protection of the owners’ property rights and that owners are 
provided just compensation when their property is involuntarily taken, 
state legislatures must eradicate the loopholes by modifying existing law. 
Specifically, I first propose that compulsory partition statutes be modified 
to ensure the partition of property rules where the property is family-
owned. Second, I propose that the cotenancy statutes are revised or 
enacted to ensure that all of a developer’s cotenants acquire a license in 
the developed property that forces a developer to share its profits with 
cotenants.  
IV. PROPOSED REMEDIES  
The struggle for African American property ownership is only one 
example of the struggle for property ownership in America; thus, 
individual rights in family-owned property should be protected by 
property rules rather than liability rules. Statutes that govern the partition 
process should adequately value the family interest holder’s investment in 
the subject property and should preserve both the interest holder’s status as 
property holder as well as the economic benefit of the individual property 
interest. In other words, resourceful parties should be prohibited from 
forcing individuals to part with their property while offering them only 
compensation for the deflated market value of the divided interest. 
Partition statutes could be modified in several alternative ways in order 
to offer adequate protection to homogenous interest holders. First, statutes 
could be modified to require a supermajority vote of the cotenants, before 
the court would have the discretion to order sale.249 Second, statutes could 
be modified to require a redemption period,250 like that found in mortgage 
forfeiture cases, where the family interest holders could gather the funds to 
redeem the property.251 Another variation of this proposal is a statutory 
 
 
passed only to family members; this is a problem specific to families. Accordingly, to remedy this 
problem, it is not necessary to protect any other class.  
 249. Some states have already incorporated this remedy in similar statutes governing cotenancy of 
mineral rights. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 31:164 (West 1987) (requiring consent of all co-owners 
before mining rights may be exercised).  
 250. Redemption period refers to a period of time, allowed either by statute or through common 
law, in which a mortgagor who has defaulted on a mortgage may pay the outstanding balance of the 
mortgage and recover the mortgaged property from forfeiture. See GRANTS S. NELSON & DALE A. 
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.1 (3d ed. 1994). 
 251. See id. 
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waiting period that would allow the family to raise funds to compensate 
the outside interest holder for the market value of their interest. 252 Third, 
the statutes could be revised to ensure that cotenants acquire a license in 
the developed property that forces the developer to share its profits.253 
In considering these alternative methods of honoring the family interest 
holder’s investment in commonly held property, one must be mindful that 
compulsory partition is an action in equity,254 created in order to avoid the 
further headaches that arise from common ownership of property.255 
However, the case of the outside interest holder does not present the same 
considerations as the case where cotenants have experienced a change of 
circumstance and are no longer practically able to enjoy common 
ownership. The developer who purchases a fractional interest in 
commonly held property obviously never intended to enjoy common 
ownership with the family. To the contrary, the developer had every 
intention, when it acquired the interest, to destroy the cotenancy in order 
to force a sale and purchase of the land. Thus, any right to equitable relief 
should be limited where the outside interest holder “attempts to discard the 
headaches that accompany the common ownership” that was voluntarily 
assumed for speculative purposes. 
A. Modifying Partition Statutes to Require a Supermajority Vote of the 
Cotenant Class 
There are several advantages to modifying partition statutes to provide 
that, in order for a heterogeneous cotenant to effect a compulsory partition, 
they must obtain a supermajority vote from their cotenants. Perhaps the 
most compelling argument favoring a rule that requires the consent of 
 
 
 252. Cf. Jolly v. Knopf, 463 So. 2d 150 (Ala. 1985) (declaring unconstitutional the application of 
a provision that preferred cotenants who were defendants in a partition action over cotenants who 
brought an action to partition by sale, where both parties desired to purchase the interests of the other 
party). The proposed statutory scheme would limit the application of a “buy out” provision to cases 
where the cotenants desiring to retain common ownership received their interests through devise or 
intestacy and where the cotenant attempting to force sale is an outside “alien” party. This statutory 
formulation presents stronger policy in terests than the case at issue in Jolly; the cotenants in my 
proposal who are able to avail themselves of the buy-back provision, are not “similarly situated” to the 
cotenants attempting to force a sale. Thus, a rule that allows for a buy-back provision where the 
plaintiff is an outside party seeking to force sale on family owners is rationally related to the state’s 
legitimate interest in protecting family ownership. See Jolly, 463 So. 2d at 154 (Torbert, J., concurring) 
(discussing the importance of protecting family interests from outsiders and suggesting that language 
specifying application in the family context would have been constitutionally valid). 
 253. See infra note 271 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra notes 85, 99 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra  notes 88, 100. 
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most of the cotenants, is that such a rule would not disadvantage interest 
holders with less financial resources in determining whose interests are 
compelling. As noted throughout this Article, new cotenants who seek to 
force sale  through the use of partition statutes may have access to greater 
resources and are greatly advantaged in the competitive bid process.256 By 
contrast, the family interest holder may receive the property through 
intestacy precisely because the family has limited means or because the 
family’s wealth is substantially invested in the subject property. 
Consequently, any rule that allows cotenants to resist only if they are 
sufficiently able to raise funds to repurchase the entire commonly held 
property effectively denies the nonfinancial interests of family cotenants. 
Current legislative policy favoring arbitration is another persuasive 
reason for requiring the consent of a cotenant supermajority prior to a 
judicially ordered sale.257 As noted before, courts are hesitant to partition 
where the interests are numerous or the geographical features affecting 
value are complex.258 Accordingly, requiring the parties to work together 
toward a nonjudicial outcome before sale is ordered allows the court to 
avoid the complicated technical analysis required to divide land by 
partition in-kind, while still preserving the common law presumption 
favoring actual partition. 
Finally, a rule that required the consent of a supermajority of cotenants 
would act as a powerful disincentive for the type of financial speculation 
discussed in this Article. Courts have consistently noted the longstanding 
policy favoring preservation of a right to inheritance.259 The market 
interests advanced by developer speculation are not sufficient to outweigh 
the strong social value of preserving inherited interests, particularly in 
communities where such ownership is directly tied to community identity. 
Thus, a requirement that cotenants consent to sale would be a useful 
method to avoid “rupturing” family interests for purely profit motives. 
 
 
 256. See supra  Part.II.C.2; supra  notes 238-47 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) 
(holding that § 2 is a “congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”); see also 
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. ch.1, § 4 (1999); Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. 
L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (1999). 
 258. See supra  Part II.B (discussing courts’ refusal to value property according to noneconomic 
interests). 
 259. See, e.g., Butte Creeke Island Ranch, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (citing Richmond v. Dofflemeyer, 
105 Cal. App. 3d 745, 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)) (noting that “[p]artition in kind is favored since this 
does not disturb the existing form of inheritance or compel a person to sell his property against his 
will”). 
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B. Modifying Partition Statutes to Allow for a Redemption Period 
The equity of redemption is a universally recognized remedy in 
mortgage law that allows a mortgagee to “redeem” the property within a 
specified time after the mortgage is forfeited.260 The redemption remedy 
may also provide a practical solution for cotenants seeking to avoid a sale 
in the judicial partition context. As in the mortgage situation, a partition 
redemption statute could provide that cotenants who received their interest 
from a family member (either through devise or intestacy) could redeem 
the property by paying the fair market value of the property within a 
specified amount of time after sale.261 
The equity redemption solution is attractive for several reasons. First, 
the equity redemption solution allows the court to engage in the same 
economic valuation that the courts have come to rely upon in partition 
cases.262 Allowing the courts to continue an economic valuation of the 
property would make it unnecessary for courts to consider the nonfinancial 
interests of the cotenants. This is useful, since courts find it difficult to 
value the contenant’s noneconomic interests in continued family 
ownership, continued status as a landowner, sentimental attachment to a 
particular tract of land, and other nonquantifiable interests.263 Once the 
court decides that partition in-kind is impractical, the court may set an 
economic value on the land, identify the requisite redemption period, and 
effectively dispose of the case. Thus, judicial efficiency is satisfied by this 
solution. 
Another important factor favoring a redemption period is the avoidance 
of a competitive bid. Because family members need only redeem the 
property by paying the fair market value as identified by the court, the land 
would not be given to the party with the most resources, typically the 
outside interest holder.264 As well, the outside holder’s interest in the 
 
 
 260. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra  note 250, § 7.1. 
 261. The time period for mortgage redemption rights usually varies from six months to three 
years. See id. Redemption rights in a partition context should be equally generous due to the difficulty 
family interest owners may have in securing funds to pay the purchase price of the subject property. 
 262. See supra  Part II.C.3. 
 263. See supra  Part II.C.; supra  note 169. 
 264. Critics may suggest that allowing the family cotenants to redeem the land for the fair market 
value will lower the amount of money the property will yield at a competitive bid sale; the buyer will 
not want to bid higher than the fair market value for fear that the property could be redeemed for less 
than the bid price. However, in the foreclosure context, the concern usually is not that the bidding 
purchaser will have paid more than the amount of the mortgage, but rather that the purchaser will have 
purchased the land for less than the mortgage judgment. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 250, 
§ 8.4. There is no reason to think that the partition competitive bid process would yield a different 
result. Consequently, by fixing the redemption amount to the fair market value determined at the time 
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property is protected because the property price is set by the fair market 
value of the entire property. This method of valuing the interest of the 
party forcing sale ensures that the party’s interest is fully compensated. 
Full compensation is one of the most commonly cited reasons for 
requiring a sale when an interest holder moves for partition.265 Therefore, 
redeeming the land at a fair market value gives the party moving for sale 
the same compensation that the other interest holders would get in a 
judicial partition by sale without divesting unwilling parties of their 
ownership interest. 
An alternative way of modifying partition statutes to allow for a buy-
back period would be to require a waiting period prior to the judicially 
ordered sale, during which the cotenants resisting sale would have the 
right to pay the fair market value of the interest held by those parties 
requesting sale.266 This formulation is similar to the redemption period 
model, except that the “buy back” would occur prior to sale and would 
require the cotenants seeking to retain ownership to raise only the value of 
the interest held by the party forcing sale. The primary virtue of this rule is 
that it would fairly balance the power of the various parties, allowing those 
with the most significant interest in the property a proportionate right to 
buy the property. When the parties seeking sale hold a significant interest, 
the burden of “buying back” the property is more financially onerous. By 
the same token, when the parties seeking sale hold only a small interest, 
the financial burden of retaining ownership would be small. While these 
solutions still burden cotenants seeking to retain ownership by requiring 
them to raise funds to retain their ownership rights, equitable redemption 
or a buy-back period would more fairly weigh the competing interests by 
avoiding the inequities of the competitive bid process. 
C. Promulgating Cotenancy Statutes Granting Cotenants a License to the 
Developed Property 
If our legal system must accept the contention that liability rules are 
preferable over property rules, then equity requires a developer, who is 
 
 
of sale, the court is fairly compensating the outside purchaser for the land, while discouraging bargain 
bids at a judicially compelled sale. 
 265. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Frumire, 325 P.2d 555 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Duke v. Hill, 314 
S.E.2d 586 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); Whatley v. Whatley, 484 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997). In each 
of these cases, Petitioners requested a sale and alleged that a division in-kind would materially impair 
their rights such that the value of their share would be materially less.  
 266. Cf. supra note 252 (discussing similar Alabama statute held unconstitutional by the Alabama 
Supreme Court). 
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guilty of forcing individuals to depart with their family-owned property, 
share its profits with its cotentants.267  
Since developers use the equitable remedy of compulsory partition to 
make substantial profits at the expense of their cotenants, equity requires, 
at the very least, that the developers share their profits. One way to ensure 
an equitable division of a developer’s profits is to vest, as a matter of law, 
a “license” in the property in the developer’s cotenants.268 
Generally, a license in real property is a personal privilege conferred to 
an individual that allows an individual to do one or more acts on the land 
of another without possessing an interest in the land.269 However, the 
concept of a license could be statutorily extended by including the 
following language: a personal privilege granted to an individual to 
receive compensation generated by real property.270 Vesting cotenants 
with a license when their family’s land is compulsorily partitioned would 
ensure that developers share their profits because, at the moment of 
partition, the cotenants would begin to enjoy a recognizable right to a 
partition of the developer’s profits. Accordingly, the cotenants could 
record their licenses in the county’s property records and thus ensure 
payment on their licenses before the developer sells the partitioned 
property to another party.271 
 
 
 267. This remedy should be awarded in addition to the “market value” for the property in the 
partition proceedings.  
 268. This proposal is similar to the “au droit” or moral rights doctrine found in the protection of 
creative art. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1998). Generally, the moral rights doctrine protects 
the personality of an artist embodied in a creative work. See Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (July 24, 1971), reprinted in 4M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, app. 
27-5-6 (1985). Since a creative work is an expression of the personality of the artist, it remains linked 
to the artist for a lifetime and thus should be protected. See Sophia Davis, State Moral Rights and the 
Federal Copyright System, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 233, 234 (1985). There are two basic rights 
that underlie the moral rights doctrine. See Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of 
Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP . L. 465, 478-83 (1968). The first is the right 
of paternity or attribution, which enables artists to vindicate a claim of authorship in their work. Id. at 
478-80. The second is the right of integrity, which allows artists to object to the distortion, mutilation, 
or other alteration of the work that would cause prejudice to the author’s honor or reputation. Id. at 
480-83. Thus, artists enjoy a right to bring a cause of action against someone who denies them the 
right to claim authorship of their work or who distorts their artwork in some way. See 8 THOMPSON ON 
REAL PROPERTY  § 64.02(b), at 7 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994). 
 269. See 8 T HOMPSON, supra  note 268. 
 270. The license should equate about five to ten percent of the sale price of the developed property 
instead of a percentage of the developer’s profits. If the value of the license is contingent upon the 
developer’s profit, then developers could easily engage in fraud by manipulating their costs and 
expenses to reduce their profits and thus, decrease the value of their cotenants licenses. Instead, the 
value of the licenses should be contingent upon the total value from which the property is sold.  
 271. One may wonder why the courts would grant the cotenants a license instead of entitling them 
to general damages from the developers. If cotenants were given the right to general damages from the 
particular developer who filed the compulsory partition action, then there would be too much room for 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that the African American family’s 
ongoing attempt to retain their family-owned properties should be 
protected by property rules. I propose that the legislatures eradicate the 
loopholes by modifying existing law. Specifically, the compulsory 
partition statutes should be modified to ensure the application of property 
rule protection where property is family-owned. The new heterogenous 
interest may be purchased by the family members to prevent the judicial 
sale of the entire tract of land. Second, if family members are unable to 
buyout the heterogeneous interest and the property is sold under the 
judicial sale, the family of homogeneous interest holders would then 
acquire a license in the development rights of the property that forces the 
successful heterogeneous interest buyer to share future profits with the 
family.  
These remedies would recognize that the meaning and significance of 
property is part of the institutional structure of society and of ongoing 
social construction. Property is part of the vast system of social relations, 
cultural relations, and material context. Peoples’ attitudes toward specific 
property interests and arrangements profoundly influence the formation of 
their social identities and take on social meaning. For many African 
Americans, property ownership and the retention of heir property are 
intrinsically connected to concepts of liberty and freedom. Liberty and 
freedom represent a psychological and internal security. For ex-slaves, a 
crucial aspect of freedom was economic freedom. This economic freedom 
was thought secure if one owned property. Property thus took on a 
significant meaning in the African American community. And even when 
one is absent from the property and not receiving any direct or present 
economic advantage from the ownership interest, the psychological impact 
of the ownership is undeniably significant. Property then exists and 
interacts with other nonproperty forms of decision making, policy, and 
control. In this larger context, the severe limitations of an anaylsis that 
posits a pure profit-driven or economic valuation are demonstrated. Any 
analysis which is so limited ignores the highly variegated conception of 
property as becoming part of one’s own identity, something which should 
not be sacrificed and then sold on the market to the highest bidder. 
Multi-ownership of property by relatives is common to many African 
 
 
developers to defraud their cotenants of their equitable compensation. For example, developers could 
form practically insolvent subsidiaries to acquire the property, “sell” the property to their parent 
corporations, and then file bankruptcy when their cotenants attempt to collect. 
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American families. This Article identifies two distinct classes of owners—
those which I term homogeneous interest owners and heterogeneous 
interest owners. This Article examines how homogenous expectations may 
be defeated when heterogeneous expectations are introduced into the 
framework of common ownership. It theorizes the process through which 
these interests are frequently partitioned and ultimately transform the 
family members from real property owners to non-owners. This process 
involves a phenomenon I call “rupturing” of heterogeneous interests which 
frequently is the catalyst for judicial partition proceedings. Partition 
proceedings then provide the opportunity for sale of the property, and 
based on a monetary valuation, the property is awarded to the highest 
bidder. I question a purely economic valuation of property in monetary 
terms. If property is widely agreed to be important for many different 
reasons, valuation should require many different scales of value. Because 
its value is multifaceted, it is difficult to capture in monetary terms. In the 
context of judicial partition, value of property is central and the 
determination of value has a great impact on the cotenant’s continued 
status as a property owner. 
In practice, common ownership is more predominant inside family 
units where the owners have similar life experiences and hence, similar 
expectations for the property. The optimal possibility for meaningful and 
satisfactory resolutions of disputes regarding future use, possession, and 
management of the resource (to avoid loss) resides within the family unit. 
The introduction of outside heterogeneous expectations disturbs this 
balance. Often, the result may appear to be an efficient bargain, which 
allows the property to go to the individual(s) who value it the most. 
However, utilizing evaluation systems with biases that measure value only 
in terms of the highest purchase price denies other important variables (for 
example, differences in cultural experience, psychological value, and 
emotional attachment) which may be essential to the way a family unit 
defines itself or sees its history, and is biased in favor of property holders 
with greater wealth.272 
The introduction of a heterogeneous economic interest into the 
ownership of productive property thus, has the potential to “drown out” 
other noneconomic interests and facilitate the sale of the property. Such a 
sale may be determined to be an “economically efficient” use of the 
property, and may, in fact be wealth maximizing, but it may also destroy 
other cultural socio-political interests and undermine civil society and 
 
 
 272. See supra  note 149. 
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democratic participation. By refusing to grant noneconomic interests equal 
or, in many instances, any standing, the courts have intentionally decided 
that such noneconomic interests have no quantifiable value that might 
justify and facilitate equitable distribution of the property; therefore, the 
courts have discounted the individual “eccentric” interest of the owner. 
These individual “eccentric” interests play a substantial role in the socio-
political power relationship between African Americans and whites within 
specific geographical regions. This consistent interpretation of the 
partition statutes by the courts facilitates a continued weakening of the 
socio-political independence and power of African Americans within the 
communities of which they are a part. Thus, not valuing noneconomic 
interest as equal to economic interest and allowing further divestment of 
property, contributes to the ongoing disparity in wealth accumulation, and 
to the suppression of political rights and the enjoyment of common values 
within the homogeneous interest group that “loses” the court case. 
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